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Preface
This thesis comprises of three main chapters (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). Chapter
4 of the thesis is the result of a collaboration with Indrajit Ray. An article
corresponding to this chapter has been published in the International Journal of
Game Theory, see Ray and Sen Gupta (2013). Chapters 2 and 3 are a result of the
collaboration with Herve Moulin and Indrajit Ray. The article forming Chapter
2 has been published in the Journal of Economic Theory, see Moulin, Ray and
Sen Gupta (2014). The article forming Chapter 3 is currently available under
the Discussion Papers series (2013) of Department of Economics, University of
Birmingham; see Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2013).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Enforcing cooperative outcomes while respecting the non-cooperative incentives
has been the dominant theme of the Game Theory literature for the past three
decades. The dynamic approach embeds the initial normal form game in a dy-
namic model (example, by repeating the game) allowing the agents to deploy
learning heuristics (i.e. agents can learn or get some information from history
of play). The self-enforcing correlation devices known as correlated equilibrium -
CE - (Aumann 1974, 1987) offer an alternative, static, approach where the co-
operative benefits are harvested in a one-shot randomized play of the game. A
normal form game can be played using a correlation device. The correlation de-
vice can be interpreted as a mediator, who is a non-strategic player of the game.
The correlation device first sends private messages to each player according to a
probability distribution and then the players play the original normal form game.
A correlation device is called direct or canonical device if the set of messages is
identical to the set of pure strategies of the original game, for each player. A di-
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rect CE can best be described as a mediator whose recommendations the players
find optimal to follow obediently. Any (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium (NE)
and any convex combination of Nash equilibria can also be viewed as a direct CE.
The probability distribution is such that no player should have an incentive to
deviate by himself from the strategy the device suggests to him. The concept of
CE is interesting because some CE outcomes may be Pareto superior to all NE
outcomes of the game; which can be shown using simple examples (even 2 × 2
normal form games), as below.
Example 1
A2 P2
A1 0, 0 7, 2
P1 2, 7 6, 6
The Pure Strategy NEs for this game are the strategy profiles (A1, P2) and
(P1, A2) with a joint payoff of 9 and the Mixed Strategy NE is the strategy
(1
3
A1,
2
3
P1;
1
3
A2,
2
3
P2) with an expected individual payoff of (4.6, 4.6), and thus a
joint payoff of 9.2. Let us now consider a correlation device (mediator) which
gives recommendations to the players of the game. The original game can be con-
sidered as an extended game in the sense that the strategies of the players is to
decide whether or not to play an obedient strategy (follow the recommendations
of the device).
A2 P2
A1 0
1
3
P1
1
3
1
3
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Let us assume that the recommendation for Player 1 (row player) is to play
P1. We want to check whether Player 1 has an incentive to play obedient strategy
or not. Given the recommendation of P1 for Player 1, the recommendations for
Player 2 will be (using Bayes’ rule), Pr(A2/P1) =
1
2
= Pr(P2/P1). Assuming
Player 2 (column player) follows the recommendation, the expected values for
Player 1 are E(A1) = 3.5 < E(P1) = 4, thereby implying that Player 1 has a clear
incentive to play the obedient strategy. This is also true for a recommendation
of A1 for Player 1. Thus the probability device is a CE for this game, giving an
expected payoff of 1
3
(7 + 2 + 6) = 5, to each player. Thus, there is clearly an
improvement over the (joint) NE payoff.
Other simple examples where some CE outcomes improve strictly over the NE
outcomes are Battle of Sexes, Stag Hunt games, etc. It was recently discovered
that CE cannot help improving upon the NE in many important microeconomic
games. Liu (1996) considered an n-firm Cournot oligopoly market with linear de-
mand and asymmetric linear cost function (constant marginal costs). Liu (1996)
used the extended definition of CE provided by Hart and Schmeidler (1989) and
found that there exists a unique CE for this game, which is same as the NE of
the game. Yi (1997) extended the results of Liu to include convex cost functions
for the firms and found the same results. This result was later on generalized
by Neyman (1997) to conclude that Cournot oligopoly games are games with a
smooth and concave potential function, and all such games have a unique CE
which coincides with the NE (or a mixture of NE) of the game.
Although CE may not achieve anything more than the NE outcome, as one
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rightly reckons, a coarsening of the set of correlated equilibria may exist. Indeed,
we do have such a coarse concept in the literature, introduced by Moulin and
Vial (1978), called the coarse correlated equilibrium1 (CCE, henceforth). The
best interpretation of this notion is that of a solicitor who asks the players to
either commit to a correlation device or to play any strategy of their own. The
agents have to decide whether or not to commit to the solicitor (mediator) and
if they decide not to commit, they can choose to play any strategy of their own,
even the strategies outside of the ones selected by the correlation device. For
an informal description of the concept of CCE (see formal Definitions 1 and 2
in Section 2.2 in Chapter 2), recall first that a CE is a probability distribution
over the outcomes of the game, commonly known to the players. Running this
lottery yields a profile of recommended strategies; the mediator informs each
player of his own recommendation, without revealing the recommendation to
any other player. The equilibrium property is that it is optimal for any player
i to follow this recommendation, if i believes that every other player is doing
the same. A CCE also selects the outcome of the game according to a commonly
known probability distribution. The difference is that the mediator has now more
commitment power. Each player must decide to commit or not to the strategy
selected for him by the mediator before the mediator runs the lottery. A player
who decides not to commit to the mediator may choose to play any strategy of his
own; he does not get to know the outcomes chosen by the lottery. The equilibrium
property is that it is best to commit to the anticipated outcome of the lottery, if
1 Moulin and Vial (1978) introduced this equilibrium concept and called it a correlation
scheme. Young (2004) and Roughgarden (2009) coined the terminology of coarse correlated
equilibrium, which we adopt, while Forgo´ (2010) called it a weak correlated equilibrium.
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one believes that every other player is doing the same. Such a weaker notion of
correlation may improve upon the NE of any game, other than strategically zero-
sum games (Moulin and Vial 1978), even though correlation a la Aumann may
not. If a NE cannot be improved upon using CCE, then it cannot be improved
by CE as well, but the converse is not true. For a game of two players with two
strategies each (2 × 2 normal form game), the CE is the same as the CCE. Let
us now consider the following example (Moulin and Vial 1978) where each of the
two players have three strategies.
Example 2
L C R
T 3, 3 1, 1 4, 1
M 1, 4 5, 2 0, 0
B 1, 1 0, 0 2, 5
There is a unique NE for this game, (T, L) = (3, 3), which is also the CE.
Thus the expected payoff for each player is 3. Let us now consider the following
probability device:
L C R
T 1
3
0 0
M 0 1
3
0
B 0 0 1
3
This device is clearly not a CE because none of the three outcomes (where the
device puts a positive probability) are NEs of the game. The dominant strategy
equilibrium (by iterative elimination of dominated strategies) and the unique NE
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of the game is (T, L), which as mentioned above is also the only CE of the game.
We need to now check if the device is a CCE or not. For the device to be a CCE,
both the players should have an incentive to ‘commit’ to the device (mediator).
Let us assume that Player 2 commits to the device, but Player 1 decides not to
commit and instead plays the pure strategy B. Thus the expected payoff accruing
to Player 1 by playing this pure strategy is E1(B) = 1(
1
3
) + 0(1
3
) + 2(1
3
) = 1.
Instead, if Player 1 commited to the device, the expected payoff achievable would
be 3(1
3
) + 5(1
3
) + 2(1
3
) = 10
3
, thereby implying that Player 1 does not have an
incentive to deviate from commiting to the device. This is also true for any
deviations (T or M) for Player 1. Therefore, the commitment device is a CCE
for this game. Thus, we see that there is a clear improvement over the NE payoff
via coarse correlation, even though CE coincides with the NE payoff. Moreover,
a probability device with probabilities 1
2
on outcomes (M,C) and (B,R) is also a
CCE for this game, giving an even higher payoff of 3.5 to each of the two players;
implying that for a particular game there can be more than one CCEs.
The main aim of this thesis, comprising of three chapters, is to consider the
concept of CCE in various contexts; quadratic games with two interesting cases
of Cournot duopoly and Public good provision (Chapter 2), emission abatement
game (Chapter 3) and linear duopoly (Chapter 4). We submit that the concept
of coarse correlation has a very natural interpretation in these games. A CCE
endows the mediator with more commitment power. As in a CE, the lottery
over strategy profiles is known to all players; but now each player must decide
to commit or not to the strategy selected for him by the mediator before the
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mediator runs the lottery. A player who does not commit will then choose his
strategy without any information on the outcome of the lottery. The equilibrium
property is that it is the best to commit to the anticipated outcome of the lottery,
if one believes that every other player is doing the same. The stability requirement
in a CCE is strictly weaker than in a CE; hence, CCEs afford more opportunities
than CEs to improve upon Nash equilibria. In the following sections we briefly
discuss the three chapters, as mentioned above.
1.1 Quadratic Games: Cournot duopoly and
Public good provision
The example on the CCE (shown above) we can derive two very important infer-
ences on the importance of CCE: firstly, in games where CE is the same as NE
(or mixture of NE), there can exist a CCE which is strictly better than the NE,
and secondly, there can exist more than one CCEs for a particular game. We
also understand (from our discussion on CE) that there exist many economically
meaningful games wherein CE can not do any better than the NE. These re-
sults directly bring us to two very interesting (and important) questions: (i) can
CCE improve the NE for the games (with concave and smooth potential funtion)
where CE does not help?; (ii) can we find an optimal (total utility maximising)
CCE for a particular game? The main aim of this chapter is to answer these
two questions. For the purpose of doing so, we consider here a class of symmetric
two-person games with one-dimensional strategies and quadratic payoff functions.
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These include simple versions of the duopoly and public good provision games.
These are games with smooth and concave potential payoff functions and there-
fore, the only CEs in these games are mixtures of pure Nash equilibria. However,
they often possess more efficient CCEs. We characterize the optimal (joint utility
maximizer) CCE for this class (Theorem 1, Chapter 2): it is a simple symmetric
mixture of two pure strategy profiles, as in the following example.
Example 3
Two players contribute non-negative amounts xi, i = 1, 2, to the public good,
produced at constant marginal cost, while the benefit from consuming it is concave
quadratic (the same for both players). The following is the payoff function of such
a game, as an example of the class of games discussed in Section 2.4 in Chapter
2.
u1(x1, x2) = x1 + 4x2 − (x1 + x2)2; u2(x1, x2) = u1(x2, x1).
Total payoff (u1 + u2)(x1, x2) is maximal iff x1 + x2 = x
eff = 1.25, with
corresponding efficient payoff u1 + u2 = pi
eff = 3.125. The Nash equilibria are
all those profiles such that x1 + x2 = 0.5, with corresponding payoff pi
N = 2. It
is easy to check that the game is a potential game with a concave (however, not
strictly concave) potential function P (x) = x1 + x2− 2x1x2− x21− x22. Therefore,
any CE of this game is a mixture of Nash equilibrium profiles.
Let us now consider a lottery L, such that, with equal probability, one player
contributes xi = 1 while the other contributes nothing. This is clearly not a CE
because neither (1, 0) nor (0, 1) is a Nash equilibrium. However it is a CCE: if
player 1 contributes x1 and assumes player 2 is contributing either 0 or 1 with
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equal probability, his payoff 1
2
[(x1 − x21) + (x1 + 4 − (x1 + 1)2] is maximized at
x1 = 0 and gives him u1 =
3
2
, precisely the same as by committing to follow the
outcome of L (but note that player 2’s best response to x1 = 0 is not to follow
L). Our results imply that the total payoff piCC = 3 is indeed the best the players
can achieve in any CCE of this game; it yields a 50% increase over and above
the Nash equilibrium payoff and only incurs a 4% efficiency loss.
Admittedly, the class of games we consider is fairly small. Yet, in addition to
the Cournot duopoly and the public good game, it captures quadratic versions of
a few other games like Bertrand duopoly, emission game (Barrett 1994)2, as well
as the search game (Diamond 1982). Moreover, even in this small class of games,
the proof of our optimality result is not simple; for instance, we have no idea how
to generalize it to the three-person case (even the asymmetric two-person case will
involve significantly more work). The literature offers no other complete analysis
of optimal coarse correlation (or, for that matter, correlation a la Aumann) for
economically meaningful games where pure strategies are one dimensional.
1.2 Abatement Game
An interesting question in the literature of environmental economics, which still
remains (somewhat) unanswered, is how the nations, acting non-cooperatively,
can deal with and achieve the goal of global emission abatement, a problem
2 We analyse this game in a parallel paper (Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta 2013) - Chapter 3 of
the thesis.
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which is of great concern since last few decades. An interesting approach towards
achievement of this goal could be by way of mediation, a concept which still
remains less explored for this problem. Mediation in this context could be useful
in achieving better coordination between the nations and direct them towards
achieving the goal of emission abatement. CE and CCE are a way of mediation
to achieve better outcomes than what could be achieved by the players acting
on their own. We, in Chapter 3, analyze the performance of coarse correlation
in a well-studied non-cooperative model from the literature in environmental
economics. The model, called the abatement game (Barrett 1994), is a game
played by several players (nations) choosing the level of abatement (pollution).
Although several (non-cooperative and cooperative) solutions3 have already been
analyzed for the abatement game, the impact of strategic correlation has not been
studied. We submit that the concept of coarse correlation has a very natural
interpretation in this game.
In a CCE, the mediator requires more commitment from the players: it asks
the players, before running the lottery, to either commit to the future outcome
of the lottery or play any strategy of their own without learning anything about
the outcome of the lottery. The equilibrium property is that each player finds
it optimal to commit ex ante to use the strategy selected by the lottery. In
the context of climate change negotiation, and in particular for the abatement
game, a correlation device can be interpreted as an independent agency providing
3 Barrett (2001) and McGinty (2007) studied asymmetric versions of the abatement game.
Barrett (1994) also considered the Stackelberg model of abatement which was later analyzed
by Rubio and Ulph (2006). Finus (2001) presented generalization of Barrett’s results in
terms of the number of countries in a stable equilibrium.
1.2. Abatement Game 25
a recommendation to all relevant countries towards the ultimate goal of global
emission reduction. In a CCE of the abatement game, each country remains free
to revert to a non-cooperative emission, but does not benefit from doing so as long
as other countries commit to the policy selected by the agency. Correlation, in
either the CE or the CCE format, has been mostly ignored by the environmental
literature.4 It might be difficult to imagine a governing body for all countries
taken together, but a governing body for smaller groups of countries might be
possible (for example European Commission for EU) and such an agency could
work as a mediator directing the countries associated towards the achievement of
the ultimate goal of emission abatement.
The abatement game is a game with a smooth and concave potential function
and hence its only CE is the (unique) Nash equilibrium. However, the game has
many more CCEs; in some cases that we identify in the chapter, some of these are
strictly more efficient than the Nash equilibrium outcome. We apply the general
methodology as in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) and formally characterize
the optimal CCE for any 2-player abatement game (Theorem 1, Chapter 3) under
the assumption that the benefit parameter (b) is bigger than the cost parameter
(c).5 As in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014), we find that the optimal lottery
is a 2-dimensional anti-diagonal symmetric lottery6. The total payoff at the
4 Forgo´, Fu¨lo¨p and Prill (2005) and Forgo´ (2011) recently used (modified versions of) Moulin
and Vial’s notion of (coarse) correlation in other environmental games. Baliga and Maskin
(2003) surveyed some models of mechanisms in this literature.
5 Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) proved that Nash equilibrium can be locally improvable
by using a concept similar to CCE under a condition, which for this game, perhaps not
surprisingly, also turns out to be b > c.
6 The optimal lottery is a symmetric lottery with finite support similar to those studied by
Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) who called such a lottery a Simple Symmetric Correlation Device
(SSCD) as introduced in Ganguly and Ray (2005) to discuss correlation.
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optimal CCE is very close to the efficient payoff for this class of games, with a
small improvement above the Nash equilibrium total payoff.
1.3 Linear duopoly game
The third and the final chapter of this thesis is a slight deviation from the first
two chapters, wherein we mainly try to achieve the optimal utility maximising
CCE in different contexts. In this chapter, as before, we do analyse a specific
model and characterise the existence of CCE in that specific model; but the
purpose of the analysis is not to see if CCE can improve the NE or not. The
notion of CE has been analysed in many strategic situations, primarily to achieve
improvement over Nash equilibrium outcomes. Unfortunately, for some games,
correlation may not achieve anything more than the Nash outcome. Arguably the
most fundamental model of strategic markets, that of oligopoly, indeed provides
one such example.
In contrast with this negative result for correlation in strategic markets, the
literature does provide, a couple of positive views of correlation in markets. First,
as one rightly reckons, a coarser notion of correlation may be able to improve upon
the Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the concept of CCE has been used by Gerard-Varet
and Moulin (1978) in specific duopoly games to achieve an improvement (locally)
over the NE payoff.
Second positive result related to correlation in strategic markets is, from a re-
cent literature (Forges and Peck 1995, Da´vila 1999), that correlation, like sunspot,
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matters in strategic market games a la Shapley and Shubik (1977). Also, sunspot
equilibrium in competitive markets (Azariadis 1981, Cass and Shell 1983) and
correlated equilibrium in non-cooperative games (Aumann 1974, 1987), are very
similar in nature and indeed closely connected, as noted earlier (Maskin and Ti-
role 1987; Aumann et al. 1988) and formally presented recently by Polemarchakis
and Ray (2006).
There are, however, a few gaps worth mentioning in the above strands of lit-
erature. First, from the analysis by Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978), we learn
under what conditions Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game can be locally im-
proved upon, using a specific notion of improvement with strategies close to the
Nash equilibrium; however, we do not know, for improvement or even for exis-
tence, whether the support of such a correlation device necessarily has to be close
to the Nash equilibrium or not. Second, from the above mentioned literature on
correlation and sunspots, we do not find the connection, if there is any, between
(coarse) correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium in oligopoly models, in
particular, duopoly games.
The purpose of this paper is precisely to bridge these gaps and thus is twofold.
We would like to find whether there exists any general (non-local) CCE in strate-
gic markets and if so, whether this equilibrium relates to the sunspot structure.
To achieve these two results, we analyze arguably the most fundamental and
surely the simplest of models in strategic markets, that of a duopoly game with
linear demand and constant marginal cost, called here, the linear duopoly game.
Establishing whether (coarse) correlation, like sunspots, matters in the strategic
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market model of the linear duopoly game is, by itself, important because it reveals
what might be achieved via pre-play communication in the presence of correla-
tion devices in a duopoly, and such knowledge can also be used to elucidate how
players coordinate on an outcome in this game. We achieve the following desired
results: we show existence of a CCE which has an obvious sunspot structure, for
the linear duopoly game.
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 (Improving Nash by Coarse Cor-
relation) precisely concentrates on providing a two-step algorithm to find utility
maximising CCEs and uses this algorithm to analyse two interesting economic
models of Cournot duopoly and public good provision; Chapter 3 (Coarse cor-
related equilibria in an abatement game) mainly looks at a very interesting (for
environmental economics) game of emission abatement and uses the main algo-
rithm provided in Chapter 2 to analyse this particular game; and finally Chapter
4 (Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games) looks at a very simple
linear duopoly game and tries to characterise and show the existence of CCE,
which has a special structure - Nash centric device - which always serves as an
equilibrium for such a game. All the three chapters start with a very brief in-
toduction, followed by the model (which includes the definitions, concepts, etc.),
results and finally the conclusion of each chapter.
Chapter 2
Improving Nash by Coarse
Correlation
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of correlated equilibrium (CE) was introduced by Aumann (1974,
1987) as a way to improve upon the Nash equilibrium in some strategic form
games, such as some versions of the Battle of the Sexes, Chicken, Stag Hunt,
etc. This is however not possible in many important microeconomic games. Liu
(1996) and Yi (1997) proved that the only CEs in a large class of oligopoly games
are mixtures of pure Nash equilibria, a result later on generalized by Neyman
(1997) and Ui (2008) to all games with a smooth and concave potential function.
Recent results show very close connections between the set of CEs and the limit
29
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behavior of regret-based heuristics1 (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000, Young 2004, Hart
2005). Thus, the concept of CE has better dynamic behavioral justifications than
the ordinary Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies).
Here, we consider the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium – CCE, with
strictly weaker stability requirements than the CE. We consider a small but eco-
nomically relevant class of games which have a smooth and concave potential
function and therefore the ordinary CE is not of any use (due to the results just
cited). For these games we compute the optimal CCE that achieve substantial
cooperative (joint) improvements (of payoffs) for the agents involved. A correla-
tion device is called a coarse correlated equilibrium if it is in no player’s interest
to choose any alternative strategy of his own, given that other players choose to
commit to the device. Just like for CE, the literature discusses the set of CCEs
in static one-shot games (Moulin and Vial 1978, Forgo´ et al 2005, Roughgarden
2009, Forgo´ 2010, Ray and Sen Gupta 2013) and vindicates it as the limit of
certain regret-based adaptive dynamics (Hart and Mas-Colell 2003, Young 2004).
The stability requirement in a CCE is strictly weaker than in a CE (see for-
mal Definitions 1 and 2 in Section 2.2.1 below); hence, CCEs afford more op-
portunities than CEs to improve upon Nash equilibria. The games discussed
in this paper are a case in point. They are symmetric two-person games with
one-dimensional strategies and quadratic payoff functions that include simple ver-
1 If each player in the game plays regret-matching, then the joint probability distribution of
the play converges to the set of CE of the stage game (Theorem 1, Hart 2005). There is
an adaptive procedure which takes place in discrete time specifying that the players adjust
strategies probabilistically. Regret matching is defined by the following rule (Hart 2005):
switch next period to a different action with a probability that is proportional to the regret
for that action, where regret is defined as the increase in payoff had such a change always
been made in the past.
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sions of the duopoly and games of public good provision. These are games with a
smooth and concave potential function and therefore the only CEs in these games
are mixtures of pure Nash equilibria (Neyman 1997). However, they often pos-
sess more efficient CCEs, as shown in the Example 3 provided in Chapter 1. We
characterize the optimal (joint utility maximizer) CCE for this class (Theorem
1): it is a simple symmetric mixture of two pure strategy profiles.
In section 3, we consider symmetric Cournot duopoly games with decreasing
linear marginal costs. The profit maximizing outcome has one firm producing
the monopoly output, while the other firm stays out. We give examples where
these are not NE, so that no randomization over these two outcomes is a CE.
Yet, tossing a fair coin to choose which firm acts as a monopolist and which stays
out, becomes a CCE. This is because if firm 1 does not commit to the outcome
of the lottery, it does not know if firm 2 is active or not, and this incertitude is
enough to nullify the benefit of deviating.
Admittedly, the class of games we consider is fairly small, but even in this
small class of games, the proof of our optimality result is not simple; for instance,
we have no idea how to generalize it to the three-person case (even the asymmet-
ric two-person case will involve significantly more work). The literature offers no
other complete analysis of optimal coarse correlation (or, for that matter, cor-
relation a la Aumann) for economically meaningful games where pure strategies
are one dimensional.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief literature review, we de-
fine CCEs in subsection 2.2.1 and introduce our symmetric quadratic two-person
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games in subsection 2.2.2, together with our general methodology. Section 2.3
develops full computations for the special case of the Cournot duopoly while sec-
tion 2.4 does so for the public good provision game and section 2.5 concludes.
The Appendix contains the proofs of two key Lemmata.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Two earlier papers are the most relevant to our analysis.
Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) consider general smooth2 two-person games
with real-valued strategies xi and payoff functions (u1(x1, x2), u2(x1, x2))
3 and
discuss the existence of a CCE improving upon a strict, regular and interior Nash
equilibrium (x1, x2).
4 They show that the answer rests (almost) entirely upon the
critical parameter
ρ =
∂2u1
∂x1∂x2
· ∂2u2
∂x1∂x2
∂2u1
∂2x1
· ∂2u2
∂2x2
(x) (2.1)
in the following sense. If ρ < 1
4
, there is no CCE improving upon the Nash
equilibrium.5 If ρ > 1
4
, there is an improving CCE, moreover it can be taken to
be a mixture of two pure strategy profiles. This result will be useful in some of
the discussion in our paper below.
2 ui is twice continuously differentiable.
3 Strategy sets X1, X2 are real compact intervals.
4 xi is the only best reply to xj ;
∂2ui
∂2xi
(x) < 0; ∂ui∂xj (x) 6= 0; xi is interior to the strategy set.
5 Note that the main Theorem in that paper considers only local improvement. According
to the Definition 3 in the paper, a Cournot Nash equilibrium (x1, x2) is said to be locally
improvable by correlation if there exists an integer n, n continuous mappings from [0, 1] into
X1 ×X2, and n continuous mappings from (0, 1) into R+, such that L(0) is a deterministic
lottery on NE outcome, δ(x1,x2), and L(t) =
∑n
i=1 αi(t)δ(xi1(t),xi2(t)) is a strict CCE for every
t ∈]0, 1] and such that the payoffs t → [L(t), u1] and t → [L(t), u2] are strictly increasing
on [0, 1]. It is easy to see that if a CCE L improves upon the Nash equilibrium x, then
εL+ (1− ε)δx defines a local improvement; so, our claim follows.
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Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) consider a duopoly model with linear demand and
constant marginal cost (a member of our class of symmetric quadratic games),
and identify a large set of CCEs, dubbed Nash-centric correlation devices because
their support is symmetric around the Nash equilibrium. These CCEs do not
improve upon the Nash equilibrium (as it turns out, no such improvement exists).
The Nash-centric devices may choose (put positive probabilities on) quantities
which maximise profit, employment, social welfare, etc., and therefore without
affecting the profits of the firms (because they still earn Nash equilibrium payoff)
other diverse equilibrium opportunities can be achieved that may be preffered
over Nash equilibrium. Just like the optimal CCEs we identify below, these are
instances of the Simple Symmetric Correlation Devices (SSCD) introduced by
Ganguly and Ray (2005) to discuss correlation; that is, these are symmetric and
their support is finite.
2.2 MODEL
2.2.1 Correlation and Coarse Correlation
Fix a two-person normal form game, G = [X1, X2;u1, u2], where the strategy sets
are closed real intervals, and the payoff functions ui : X1 ×X2 → R, i = 1, 2, are
continuous. We write C(X1 × X2) for the set of such continuous functions and
similarly, C(Xi) for the set of continuous functions on Xi.
Let L (X1 ×X2) with generic element L and L (Xi) with generic element `i
be the sets of probability measures on X1 × X2 and Xi respectively. That is to
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say, L is a Radon measure6 on X1 × X2 of mass 1 (similarly, so is `i, on Xi).
We write the mean of ui(x1, x2) w.r.t. L as ui(L); similarly, f(`i) is the mean of
f(xi) w.r.t. `i for any f ∈ C(Xi). Given L ∈ L (X1 × X2), we write Li for the
marginal distribution of L on Xi, defined as follows:
∀f ∈ C(X1), f(L1) = f ∗(L), where f ∗(x1, x2) = f(x1) for all x1, x2 ∈ X1 ×X2
(2.2)
(with a symmetric definition for L2).
The deterministic distribution at z is denoted by δz. We often consider prod-
uct distributions such as δx1 ⊗ `2 and `1⊗ δx2 and we write ui(δx1 ⊗ `2) simply as
ui(x1, `2).
We now define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 2.1. A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) of the game G is a lottery
L ∈ L (X1 ×X2) such that
u1(L) ≥ u1(x1, L2) and u2(L) ≥ u2(L1, x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2. (2.3)
Consider the normal form game G˜ = [X1 ∪ {N}, X2 ∪ {N}; u˜1, u˜2] where the
additional strategy N means “commit to the outcome of L”. Payoffs are the same
as in G if no player chooses N, otherwise are as follows:
u˜1(N,N) = u1(L); u˜1(N, x2) = u1(L1, x2); u˜1(x1,N) = u1(x1, L2)
6 A positive linear functional on C(X1 ×X2).
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(with a symmetric definition for L2). Then, L is a CCE if and only if (N,N) is a
Nash equilibrium of G˜ (as discussed in the Introduction).
The definition of a CCE can be easily rewritten (as shown in Ray and Sen
Gupta 2013) for any finite n-person normal form game, [N, {Xi}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ],
with set of players, N = {1, ...., n}, finite pure strategy sets, X1, ...., Xn with
X =
∏
i∈N Xi, and payoff functions, u1, ...., un, ui : X → <, for all i. For
such a game, a probability distribution L over X is a CCE if for all i, for
all x′i ∈ Xi,
∑
x∈X L(x)ui(x) ≥
∑
x−i∈X−i L
i(x−i)ui(x′i, x−i), where L
i(x−i) =∑
xi∈Xi L(xi, x−i) is the marginal probability distribution over x−i ∈ X−i, for any
deviant i ∈ N while the others commit to L.
The next concept is correlated equilibrium a la Aumann.
Definition 2.2. A correlated equilibrium (CE) of the game G is a lottery L ∈
L (X1 ×X2) such that for any measurable mapping ϕ : X1 → X1, we have
u1(L) ≥ uϕ1 (L), where uϕ1 (x1, x2) = u1(ϕ(x1), x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2 (2.4)
(and a symmetric property for u2).
7
The definition of a CE is more transparent when the strategy sets are finite, so
that we can define the conditional distribution L[x1] ∈ L (X2) of L with respect
to strategy x1 in the support of L
1. Then inequality (2.4) amounts to
u1(x1, L[x1]) ≥ u1(x′1, L[x1]) for all x1, x′1 ∈ X1
7 Note that uϕ1 is bounded and measurable, hence integrable w.r.t. L.
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and is interpreted in the usual way: the mediator reveals to player 1 the coordinate
x1 of the outcome of L and then player 1 has no incentive to choose another
strategy.
To check that the equilibrium condition for CE is (much) stronger than that
for CCE, fix any x1 ∈ X1 and choose the constant function ϕ : ϕ(x1) ≡ x1.
Then (2.2) applied to L2 implies uϕ1 (L) = f(L
2) for f(x2) = u1(x1, x2), therefore
uϕ1 (L) = u1(x1, L
2).
2.2.2 Quadratic Games and CCEs
For most of this paper, we consider symmetric two-person games with strategies
X1 = X2 = R+ and quadratic payoffs. Their general form is as follows:
u1(x1, x2) = ax1 + bx2 + cx1x2 + dx
2
1 + ex
2
2 (2.5)
where a, b, c, d, e, are constant (and a symmetric u2).
We always assume d < 0 (the sign of e does not matter) to avoid unbounded
play, and ensure the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium. Clearly, this
game has a potential function P (x1, x2) = a(x1 + x2) + cx1x2 + d(x
2
1 + x
2
2) which
is concave (resp. strictly concave) if and only if |c| ≤ 2d (resp. |c| < 2d).
Our goal is to compute the CCEs maximizing the total payoff u1 + u2 and to
compare this joint payoff with the efficient payoff and Nash equilibrium payoff.
Because our game is symmetric, if L is a CCE then L˜ obtained by exchanging
the role of x1 and x2 is also a CCE and so is
1
2
L + 1
2
L˜. Moreover, all three give
the same joint payoff. We can thus limit our search to symmetric lotteries L only
2.2. MODEL 37
(because, when we identify an optimal symmetric CCE, we are also capturing an
optimal CCE among all CCEs, symmetric or otherwise). We write L sy(R2+) for
the set of symmetric lotteries.
The key to the entire exercise is to write the CCE equilibrium condition (2.3)
in terms of three moments of L. If L is the distribution of the symmetric random
variable (Z1, Z2), these are respectively the expected values of Zi, Z
2
i , and Z1 ·Z2
as denoted below.
α = EL[Zi]; β = EL[Z
2
i ]; γ = EL[Z1 · Z2] (2.6)
Lemma 2.3. Any symmetric lottery L ∈ L sy(R2+) is a CCE of the game (2.5)
if and only if
max
z≥0
{(a+ cα)z + dz2} ≤ aα + dβ + cγ
and the corresponding utility (for one player) is
u1(L) = (a+ b)α + (d+ e)β + cγ.
Proof. First note that the expected utility (for one player) from any L for the
game (2.5) can be written as
u1(L) = aEL[Z1] + bEL[Z2] + cEL[Z1 · Z2] + dEL[Z21 ] + eEL[Z22 ]
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which by symmetry is
u1(L) = (a+ b)EL[Z1] + (d+ e)EL[Z
2
1 ] + cEL[Z1 · Z2]
= (a+ b)α + (d+ e)β + cγ.
Now, consider the expected payoff when player 1 plays a pure strategy z while
player 2 “commits”. This is given by
(a+ cEL[Z2])z + bEL[Z2] + dz
2 + eEL[Z
2
2 ]
= (a+ cα)z + dz2 + bα + eβ.
Hence, L is a CCE if and only if
max
z≥0
{(a+ cα)z + dz2} ≤ aα + dβ + cγ
rearranging the CCE equilibrium condition (2.3).
In order to derive the utility maximizing CCEs, we identify the range of the
vector (α, β, γ) when L ∈ L sy(R2+). We also show that this range is covered by
two families of very simple lotteries with at most four strategy profiles in their
support.
Let L ∗ be the subset of L sy(R2+) containing the simple lotteries of the form
L = q
2
(δz,z + δz′,z′) +
p
2
(δz,z′ + δz′,z), where z, z
′, q and p are non-negative and
q + p = 1.
LetL ∗∗ be the subset ofL sy(R2+) of the form L = q·δz,z+q′·δ0,0+ p2(δ0,z+δz,0),
2.2. MODEL 39
where z, q, q′ and p are non-negative and q + q′ + p = 1.
Lemma 2.4. i) For any L ∈ L sy(R2+) and the corresponding random variable
(Z1, Z2), we have
α, γ ≥ 0; β ≥ γ; β + γ ≥ 2α2; (2.7)
ii) Equality β = γ holds if and only if L is diagonal: Z1 = Z2 (a.e.);
iii) Equality β + γ = 2α2 holds if and only if L is anti-diagonal: Z1 + Z2 is
constant (a.e.);
iv) For any (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+ satisfying inequalities (2.7), there exists L ∈ L ∗ ∪
L ∗∗ with precisely these parameters.
The proof is postponed to the Appendix. Note that (2.7) implies β ≥ α2,
with equality β = α2 if and only if L is deterministic, because β = α2 implies
both β = γ and β + γ = 2α2.
Lemmata 2.3 and 2.4 imply the following two-step algorithm to find the utility
maximizing CCEs.
Theorem 2.5. Given the quadratic game (2.5), the following nested programs
generate the utility maximizing CCEs:
Step 1: Fix α non negative, and solve the linear program
max
β,γ
{(d+ e)β + cγ} under constraints
β ≥ γ ≥ 0; β + γ ≥ 2α2; dβ + cγ ≥ max
z≥0
{(a+ cα)z + dz2} − aα.
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Step 2: With the solutions β(α), γ(α) found in Step 1, solve
max
α
{(a+ b)α + (d+ e)β(α) + cγ(α)} under constraints
α ≥ 0; max
z≥0
{(a+ cα)z + dz2} ≤ aα + dβ(α) + cγ(α).
Moreover, there is a utility maximizing CCE in L ∗ ∪L ∗∗.
We can finally compare the optimal joint utility in a CCE to that of the Nash
equilibrium (or equilibria) of the game.
A complete discussion of these two programs for an arbitrary game given by (2.5)
involves too many cases to be of any help. So, in the next two sections, we focus
on two simple subclasses with a familiar microeconomic interpretation, where our
Theorem 2.5 can be usefully applied.
2.3 COURNOT DUOPOLY
The general form of the symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear demand and
quadratic costs is
ui(x1, x2) = (A−B(x1 + x2))+ · xi − f(xi)
(with the notation (z)+ = max{z, 0}), where A and B are positive constants, f
is the cost function and xi is firm i’s supply.
The quadratic cost function f may have increasing or decreasing marginal
costs. Under increasing marginal costs, we set f(x1) = Cx1 +Dx
2
1 for all x1 ≥ 0,
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with C, D > 0. This game has a unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium which is
strict, regular and interior (see Subsection 1.1 above). The critical coefficient here
is ρ = B
2
[2(B+D)]2
< 1
4
. Therefore, by the result in Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978)
mentioned in Subsection 2.1.1, no CCE can improve upon the Nash equilibrium.
2.3.1 Decreasing Marginal Cost
We turn to the case of decreasing marginal cost in which the cost function8 f is
as follows.
f(x1) = Cx1 −Dx21 for 0 ≤ x1 ≤
C
2D
; f(x1) =
C2
4D
for x1 ≥ C
2D
We assume A > C to ensure a strict incentive to supply some positive amount
at the null output. To guarantee that ui is concave in xi, we further assume
B > D.
The optimal monopoly output for this model is xm = A−C
2(B−D) , whenever
A−C
2(B−D)
is in (0, C
2D
), i.e., whenever A
C
< B
D
; otherwise, xm = A
2B
. To keep our discussion
simple, we concentrate on the former standard case, A
C
< B
D
, where the marginal
cost is still positive at the monopoly output so that xm = A−C
2(B−D) . Then the
monopoly profit is pim = (A−C)
2
4(B−D) . Our assumptions on parameters are:
1 <
A
C
<
B
D
(2.8)
8 Note that this function is, strictly speaking, piecewise-quadratic. However, under the as-
sumptions (2.8), the Nash equilibrium strategies, the efficient strategies, and the support of
our optimal CCEs, all belong to the strictly concave part of the domain of f .
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It will thus be convenient to express the profit function as follows.
u1(x1, x2) = ax1 − dx21 − cx1x2
where, a = A−C, d = B−D and c = B are all positive; moreover, D > 0 implies
c
d
> 1. The critical parameter in our analysis below is indeed θ = c
d
, varying in
]1,∞[.
The monopoly output is xm = a
2d
with corresponding profit pim = a
2
4d
. This is
the maximal total (of two firms’) profit and it is achieved, for instance, by the
fair (symmetric) lottery Lm = 1
2
δ(xm,0) +
1
2
δ(0,xm).
The game has a unique symmetric9 Cournot-Nash equilibrium xCN = a
c+2d
,
achieving total profit piCN = (u1 + u2)(x
CN , xCN) = 2a
2d
(c+2d)2
.
The relative efficiency of this Cournot-Nash equilibrium is pi
CN
pim
= 8
( c
d
+2)2
=
8
(θ+2)2
, that decreases rapidly from 88.9%, for θ = 1 (i.e., linear costs with D = 0),
to 0 as θ increases (i.e., B
D
decreases).
The potential function for this game is PC(x1, x2) = a(x1 + x2) − cx1x2 −
d(x21 + x
2
2), which is concave, indeed strictly concave, when θ =
c
d
< 2. Thus,
following Neyman (1997; Theorem 2), when θ < 2, there is a unique CE for this
game that coincides with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium xCN .
We now compute the optimal (profit maximizing) CCE with the help of our
Theorem 2.5. We distinguish three cases as below, based on the range of θ = c
d
.
9 Asymmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria may arise as well which are discussed below.
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Case 1: Strongly decreasing marginal costs: θ ≥ 2⇐⇒ 1 < B
D
≤ 2
There are two pure Nash equilibria in each of which firm i supplies the monopoly
quantity xm and crowds firm j out. Indeed, we have u2(x
m, x2) = (a− cxm)x2 −
dx22 = a(1− 12 cd)x2−dx22, so that (xm, 0) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if cd > 2.
Therefore, the “random monopoly” lottery, Lm = 1
2
δ(xm,0) +
1
2
δ(0,xm), which is
the average of two Nash equilibria, is a CE (a la Aumann). Full efficiency is thus
achieved with stronger incentive properties of CE as opposed to CCE.
Case 2: Moderately decreasing marginal costs: 1.171 ≤ θ < 2 ⇐⇒ 2 <
B
D
≤ 6.828
The monopoly outcome (xm, 0) is no longer a Nash equilibrium here and thus
the random monopoly is not a CE either. However, we show that the latter is
a CCE and is fully efficient. On the other hand, the symmetric Cournot-Nash
equilibrium (xCN , xCN) is the only Nash equilibrium (the relative efficiency of
which, in this interval of θ, decreases from 79.5%, for θ = 1.171, to 50%, for
θ = 2).
Proposition 2.6. For θ = B
B−D ∈ [2(2 −
√
2), 2] ' [1.171, 2], the random
monopoly, Lm = 1
2
δ(xm,0) +
1
2
δ(0,xm), is a fully efficient (hence, optimal) CCE.
Proof. For the lottery Lm, we have α = 1
2
xm = a
4d
, β = 1
2
(xm)2 = a
2
8d2
and γ = 0.
By Lemma 1 (modulo a change of sign for c and d), Lm is a CCE if and only if
max
z≥0
{(a− ac
4d
)z − dz2} ≤ a
2
8d
.
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By assumption c
4d
< 1, the left-hand side is a
2
4d
(1 − c
4d
)2 and the equilibrium
condition therefore is (1− c
4d
)2 ≤ 1
2
, which boils down to c
d
≥ 2(2−√2).
Case 3: Lightly decreasing marginal costs: 1 < θ < 1.171⇐⇒ B
D
> 6.828
Now we assume θ ∈]1, 2(2−√2)[, which is the most interesting case because the
random monopoly is no longer a CCE, and the optimal CCE captures less than
the efficient surplus, yet substantially more than the unique Nash equilibrium
(xCN , xCN) (the relative efficiency of which, in this interval of θ, decreases from
88.9%, for θ = 1, to 79.5%, for θ = 1.171). The proof of the following result
requires the full force of our Theorem 2.5.
Proposition 2.7. For θ = B
B−D ∈]1, 2(2 −
√
2)[, the optimal CCE is LCC =
1
2
δ(xCC ,0) +
1
2
δ(0,xCC), where x
CC = 2a
d(2+θ+2
√
θ−1) .
Proof. Consider the linear program in Step 1 of Theorem 2.5, where α is fixed,
taking into account the change of sign as follows.
min
β,γ
{dβ + cγ} under constraints
β ≥ γ ≥ 0; β + γ ≥ 2α2; dβ + cγ ≤ aα−max
z≥0
{(a− cα)z − dz2}.
As c > d, the optimal choice is clearly β = 2α2 and γ = 0. By Lemma 2.4, this
implies that the corresponding lottery L in L sy(R2+) is anti-diagonal: if (Z1, Z2)
has probability distribution L, then Z1 +Z2 = 2α (a.e.). Moreover, γ = 0 implies
Z1 · Z2 = 0 (a.e.), so that L takes the simple form L = 12δ(2α,0) + 12δ(0,2α), i.e., a
lottery in L ∗ ∩L ∗∗.
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Note that the equilibrium condition for CCE dβ + cγ ≤ aα − maxz≥0{(a −
cα)z − dz2} places the following constraint on α.
max
z≥0
{(a− cα)z − dz2} ≤ aα− 2dα2 (2.9)
Step 2 in Theorem 2.5 now is
max
α
aα− 2dα2 under the constraint (2.9).
We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: α ≥ a
c
. The left-hand-side in (2.9) is 0, so this inequality gives α ≤ a
2d
,
which together with α ≥ a
c
contradicts the assumption θ < 2.
Case 2: α < a
c
. The left-hand-side in (2.9) is now (a−cα)
2
4d
; thus, the inequality
in (2.9) is
(8d2 + c2)α2 − 2a(c+ 2d)α + a2 ≤ 0.
Upon changing the variable α to λ = d
a
α, the assumption α < a
c
becomes
λ < 1
θ
, and the program in Step 2 can be written as:
max
λ
{λ− 2λ2} under H(λ) = (8 + θ2)λ2 − 2(2 + θ)λ+ 1 ≤ 0.
The discriminant of H is 4(θ − 1) > 0, with minimum at λ = 2+θ
8+θ2
. It is easy
to check that 1
4
< 2+θ
8+θ2
< 1
2
. Moreover, we have, H(1
2
) = 1
4
(2 − θ)2 > 0 and
H(1
4
) = 1
16
(θ2 − 8θ + 8), also non negative, because the roots of θ2 − 8θ + 8 are
2(2 −√2) and 2(2 +√2) and by assumption θ < 2(2 −√2). We thus conclude
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that both roots of H are in [1
4
, 1
2
].
The function λ − 2λ2 peaks at 1
4
; as we are maximizing it over a subinterval
of [1
4
, 1
2
], the optimal λ is the lowest root of H, namely,
λ˜ =
2 + θ − 2√θ − 1
8 + θ2
=
1
2 + θ + 2
√
θ − 1.
The optimal α is α˜ = a
d
λ˜. Thus, we conclude xCC = 2α˜ = 2a
d(2+θ+2
√
θ−1) as
desired.
Total profit at the optimal CCE is
piCC = (u1 + u2)(L
CC) = aα˜− 2dα˜2 = 2a
2(θ + 2
√
θ − 1)
d(2 + θ + 2
√
θ − 1)2
which is easy to check.
Efficiency performance
We collect the results of the three cases above.
Corollary 2.8. In the Cournot duopoly with decreasing marginal costs satisfying
(2.8), the relative efficiency of the optimal CCE and its relative improvement
over the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium only depend upon the parameter
θ = B
B−D , as follows:
piCC
pim
=

8(θ+2
√
θ−1)
(2+θ+2
√
θ−1)2 for 1 < θ ≤ 1.171
1 for θ ≥ 1.171
piCC
piCN
=

(θ+2)2(θ+2
√
θ−1)
(2+θ+2
√
θ−1)2 for 1 < θ ≤ 1.171
(θ+2)2
8
for θ ≥ 1.171
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Figure 2.1 illustrates the behavior of the two ratios10 in Corollary 2.8.
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Figure 2.1: pi
CC
pim
and pi
CC
piCN
for Cournot Duopoly
As an example of Case 3, consider θ = 1.1, corresponding, for instance, to the
game with payoff function u1(x1, x2) = 2x1 − x21 − (1.1)x1x2. The optimal CCE
has one firm producing xCC = 1.07 while the other firm stays out, alternating
roles with equal probabilities. The efficiency ratio is very high: pi
CC
piM
= 0.995,
allowing a near 20% improvement over and above the Cournot Nash equilibrium:
piCC
piCN
= 1.192.
2.4 PUBLIC GOOD PROVISION
In this game of contributions to a public good, we have two identical agents for
whom the cost of contributing to the public good is linear and the benefit from
10 For clarity in presentation, we have trauncated the range of θ in Figure 2.1.
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the public good is concave, quadratic in total contributions. Formally,
u1(x1, x2) = A(x1 + x2)−D(x1 + x2)2 − Cx1
where A, C and D are positive constants. We also assume A > C, so that any
Nash equilibrium (of voluntary contributions) involves positive contributions.11
We rewrite the payoff function in a more compact form
u1(x1, x2) = ax1 + bx2 − d(x1 + x2)2
with a = A− C < b = A and d = D (a, b and d are positive).
The efficient level of public good, xeff , maximizes u1 + u2 = (a + b)(x1 +
x2) − 2d(x1 + x2)2. Thus xeff = a+b4d and the efficient total payoff is pieff =
(a+b)2
8d
. A Nash equilibrium is any pair (x1, x2) such that x1 + x2 = x
N = a
2d
,
with corresponding total (of both players) equilibrium payoff piN = (a + b)xN −
2d(xN)2 = ab
2d
. Note that the split of the efficient (respectively, Nash equilibrium)
contribution between the two players is arbitrary.
The potential function for this game is PPG(x) = a(x1 + x2) − d(x1 + x2)2,
therefore concave but not strictly so. The potential is maximal when x1 + x2 =
xN = a
2d
, implying that any CE of this game is a mixture of Nash equilibrium
profiles (Neyman 1997; Theorem 1).
We now look for the optimal CCE for this game. We find that, as in the
11 If A < C < 2A, the Nash equilibrium is (0, 0) but there is still a positive payoff for cooperative
players. In this case, computations similar to the ones below (and thus omitted for brevity)
show that no CCE yields a positive payoff.
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Cournot duopoly example, for a large set of parameters (C
A
≤ 2
3
), the optimal
symmetric CCE is fully efficient. This is statement i) in our next result.
Proposition 2.9. i) If b
a
≤ 3 ⇔ 3C ≤ 2A, the optimal symmetric CCE is L =
1
2
δ(xeff ,0) +
1
2
δ(0,xeff ), dividing equally the efficient total profit pi
CC = pieff = (a+b)
2
8d
.
ii) If b
a
≥ 3 ⇔ 3C ≥ 2A, the optimal symmetric CCE is L = 1
2
δ(a
d
,0) +
1
2
δ(0,a
d
),
dividing equally the total profit piCC = a(b−a)
d
.
Proof. Write the linear program in Step 1 of Theorem 2.5, where α is fixed:
min
β,γ
{2d(β + γ)} under constraints
β ≥ γ ≥ 0; β + γ ≥ 2α2; d(β + 2γ) ≤ aα−max
z≥0
{(a− 2dα)z − dz2}.
The minimum of both β+γ and β+2γ in the region {β ≥ γ ≥ 0; β+γ ≥ 2α2}
is achieved at β = 2α2 and γ = 0.
Therefore, this choice maximizes our objective function and makes the con-
straint as weak as possible. Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 2.7, the optimal
symmetric CCE takes the form L = 1
2
δ(2α,0) +
1
2
δ(0,2α), L ∈ L ∗ ∩L ∗∗, where α
solves the program in Step 2 as follows:
max
α
{(a+ b)α− 4dα2} under constraints
α ≥ 0; max
z≥0
{(a− 2dα)z − dz2} ≤ aα− 2dα2.
If α ≥ a
2d
, the constraint reduces to 0 ≤ α(a − 2dα) ⇒ α = a
2d
. So, we can
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assume α ≤ a
2d
and rewrite the above constraints as
(a− 2dα)2
4d
≤ aα− 2dα2 ⇐⇒ (a− 2dα)(6dα− a) ≥ 0.
So, finally the constraints boil down to α ∈ [ a
6d
, a
2d
].
The unconstrained maximum α∗ = a+b
8d
of the objective function is in the
above interval if and only if b ≤ 3a (recall b > a); in this case, the optimal
symmetric CCE, L, as below, is fully efficient.
L =
1
2
δ(a+b
4d
,0) +
1
2
δ(0,a+b
4d
) =
1
2
δ(xeff ,0) +
1
2
δ(0,xeff )
On the other hand if b > 3a, we have α∗ > a
2d
and hence the optimal choice
is α̂ = a
2d
with the optimal symmetric CCE L = 1
2
δ(a
d
,0) +
1
2
δ(0,a
d
), as in the
statement. Following Lemma 2.3, the optimal CCE payoff, piCC , in this case is
piCC = 2((a+ b)α− 4dα2) = a(b−a)
d
.
2.4.1 Efficiency Performance
We present the relative efficiencies of the optimal CCEs for the two cases in
Proposition 2.9 above.
Corollary 2.10. In our game of public good provision, the relative efficiency of
the optimal CCE and its relative improvement over the symmetric Nash equilib-
rium depend only upon the parameter σ = C
A
= b−a
b
, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, as follows:
piCC
pieff
=
 1 for 0 ≤ σ ≤
2
3
8σ(1−σ)
(2−σ)2 for
2
3
≤ σ ≤ 1.
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piCC
piN
=

(2−σ)2
4(1−σ) for 0 ≤ σ ≤ 23
2σ for 2
3
≤ σ ≤ 1.
Figure2.2 below shows the behavior of these two ratios in Corollary 2.10.
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Figure 2.2: pi
CC
pieff
and pi
CC
piN
for Provision of Public Good
Note that the improvement over the Nash equilibrium is at least 33% whenever
C
A
≤ 2
3
, and reaches 100% as C
A
approaches 1.
The example in the Introduction is a game for which σ = 3
4
; the results
reported there follow directly from the Proposition 2.9 and Corollary 2.10.
2.5 CONCLUSION
We have analyzed coarse correlated equilibria in a class of two-person symmetric
games where correlation a la Aumann does not offer anything more than the
Nash equilibrium. Relying heavily on the quadratic form of the payoff function,
we have characterized the utility maximizing CCE and have shown that they
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have a very simple support with only four deterministic strategy profiles. Such
a computation is the first of its kind for coarse correlated equilibria and, as far
as we know, there is no similar result for standard correlated equilibria. This is
why we regard this exercise as an interesting first step towards more sophisticated
computations.
Our methodology can be extended to games where the strategy sets are
bounded, such as the search game (Diamond 1982). In the case of the bounded
strategy sets, say, X1 = X2 = [0,M ], Lemma 2.3 is preserved, but we need to
adapt the key Lemma 2.4 to describe the range of the three moments (α, β, γ) for
all symmetric probability distributions L on [0,M ]2. This is done in the Appendix
(see Lemma 2.11, more involved than Lemma 2.4).
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2.6 APPENDIX
2.6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Statement i): Using the symmetry of L, we have
β =
1
2
(EL[Z
2
1 ] + EL[Z
2
2 ]) = EL[
1
2
(Z21 + Z
2
2)] ≥ EL[Z1 · Z2] = γ.
Also, note that α = 1
2
(EL[Z1] + EL[Z2]) implies 2α
2 = 1
2
(EL[Z1 + Z2])
2.
Moreover, β + γ = EL[
1
2
(Z21 + Z
2
2) + Z1 · Z2] = 12EL[(Z1 + Z2)2]. Hence,
β + γ ≥ 2α2 follows from EL[X2] ≥ (EL[X])2.
Statements ii) and iii): It is straightforward to show that β = γ holds if and
only if L is diagonal; also, β + γ = 2α2 holds if and only if Z1 + Z2 is constant.
Statement iv): We compute successively the range of L ∗, i.e., the set of triple
(α, β, γ) when L is in L ∗, and then the range of L ∗∗.
Claim 1: The range of L ∗ is described by the following system:
γ ≤ β ≤ 2α2 ≤ β + γ. (2.10)
From the proof of statement i), we have β ≥ γ and 2α2 ≤ β + γ. To check
2α2 ≥ β, fix L ∈ L ∗. We have z + z′ = 2α and z2 + z′2 = 2β (by symmetry).
Moreover, z2 +z′2 ≤ (z+z′)2, as z and z′ are non-negative. Hence, the inequality
β ≤ 2α2 follows.
Conversely, fix (α, β, γ) satisfying (2.10) and check first the existence of non-
negative numbers z and z′ such that their sum is S = z + z′ = 2α and their
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product is P = zz′ = 1
2
((z+ z′)2− (z2 + z′2)) = 2α2− β. Note that both the sum
S and the product P are non-negative by assumption, so the existence of z and
z′ follows from the inequality S2 ≥ 4P ⇐⇒ 4α2 ≥ 4(2α2 − β) ⇐⇒ β ≥ α2. We
already noted that system (2.10) implies β ≥ α2. It remains to choose q and p
so that γ = q
2
(z2 + z′2) + pzz′ = qβ + p(2α2 − β), which is clearly possible if and
only if 2α2 − β ≤ γ ≤ β.
Claim 2: The range of L ∗∗ contains (0, 0, 0) and the following triples
(α, β, γ), where α > 0:
2β − β
2
α2
≤ γ ≤ β. (2.11)
We first show that these two inequalities imply 2α2 ≤ β + γ. If β ≥ 2α2,
there is nothing to prove; so, we assume β ≤ 2α2. We have β + γ ≥ 3β − β2
α2
and
3β − β2
α2
≥ 2α2 ⇐⇒ (β
α
− α)(β
α
− 2α) ≤ 0, which follows from α2 ≤ β ≤ 2α2. If
α = 0, then L = δ0,0 which is of course in L ∗∗. We thus assume α > 0. For any
L ∈ L ∗∗, we have:
α = (q +
p
2
)z; β = (q +
p
2
)z2; γ = qz2. (2.12)
Therefore, 2β − γ = (q + p)z2 ≤ z2 = β2
α2
, which proves (2.11).
Conversely, we fix (α, β, γ) satisfying (2.11) and show that system (2.12) de-
fines (uniquely) z and a set of convex weights (q, q′, p). We have z = β
α
> 0,
because α > 0; therefore, β > 0 as well and we compute
q +
p
2
=
α2
β
; q =
α2
β2
γ ⇒ p = 2α
2
β
(1− γ
β
)
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Clearly, q is non-negative; so is p, because γ ≤ β. It only remains to check
q + p ≤ 1⇐⇒ 2α
2
β
− α
2
β2
γ ≤ 1⇐⇒ 2β − β
2
α2
≤ γ
which indeed is (2.11). Hence, Claim 2 is proved.
To conclude the proof of the Lemma, we check finally that the union of the
subsets of R3+ defined by (2.10) and (2.11) is precisely the set (2.7). We already
know the inclusion (2.10) ∪ (2.11) ⊆ (2.7). Conversely, if (2.7) holds and β ≥
2α2, then we have γ ≥ 2α2 − β ≥ 2β − β2
α2
, because, the latter inequality is
β2
α2
− 3β + 2α2 ≥ 0⇐⇒ (β
α
− α)(β
α
− 2α) ≥ 0 which follows from β ≥ 2α2. 
2.6.2 Bounded strategy sets
We assume X1 = X2 = [0,M ]. It turns out that the range of the three moments
(α, β, γ) over all symmetric probability distributions L on [0,M ]2 contains strictly
the range for the subsets of simple lotteries L ∗ ∪L ∗∗.
Lemma 2.11. i) For any L ∈ L , we have β ≥ γ; β+γ ≥ 2α2; α ≤M ; β ≤ αM ;
ii) The range of L ∗ is described by the system: γ ≤ β ≤ 2α2 ≤ β + γ;
β ≤ α2 + (M − α)2;
iii) The range of L ∗∗ is described by the system: 2β − β2
α2
≤ γ ≤ β; β ≤ αM .
Proof. Statement i) For any L ∈ L , we have Z2i ≤ ZiM ⇒ β = EL(Z2i ) ≤
EL(Zi)M .
Statement ii) Consider any L ∈ L ∗, where z and z′ are both in [0,M ]. They
are the roots of the polynomial Y 2 − SY + P where S = 2α and P = 2α2 − β.
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As S ∈ [0,M ], this implies M2 − SM + P ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ M2 − 2αM + 2α2 ≥ β as
desired. The converse is also easy to prove. If any (α, β, γ) meets the inequalities
in Statement ii), one can construct z and z′ exactly as in the proof of Claim 1 in
Lemma 2.4 and they are both in [0,M ]. The choice of p and q also proceeds as
before.
Statement iii) For any L ∈ L ∗∗, the inequalities in statement iii) follow from
the system (2.11) and statement i). Conversely, fix any (α, β, γ) satisfying the
inequalities in the statement and construct z as in Lemma 2.4. Use the system
(2.12) to define z, q, q′ and p as in Lemma 2.4.Then, z = β
α
≤ M ; so, the
constructed L has its support in [0,M ]2.
Note that in the statement i) in Lemma 2.11, β = αM if and only if the
support of L is Z1 = Z2 = {0,M}. This is because the equality holds only if
Z2i = ZiM a.e., i.e., Zi = 0,M a.e.. Also note that the inequalities in statement
ii) imply β ≤ αM (which is clear if M ≥ 2α; and if M ≤ 2α, observe that
(M − α)(M − 2α) ≤ 0⇐⇒ α2 + (M − α)2 ≤ αM).
Chapter 3
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in
an Abatement Game
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It has been well-developed that the NE of the abatement game (which acts as
a prisoner’s dilemma) is not a globally optimal solution, and the best response
of each nation would be ‘not to abate’ pollution, as abating pollution involves
costs which outweigh the benefits (especially in current period) accruing to each
nation. Moreover, since the emissions are a pure public good (bad), a country
would still enjoy the benefits of the reduced emissions (if other countries abate).
This is referred to as a problem of free-riding. This problem of free-riding is
because of the lack of coordination among the countries.
A correlation device is a lottery over the outcomes (strategy profiles) of the
game. A correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987; thereafter CE) is imple-
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mented1 by a mediator who selects strategy profiles according to a publicly known
probability distribution and sends to each player the private recommendation to
play the corresponding realized strategy. The equilibrium property is that each
player finds it optimal to follow this recommendation. In a coarse correlated
equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978; thereafter CCE), the mediator requires more
commitment from the players: it asks the players, before running the lottery, to
either commit to the future outcome of the lottery or play any strategy of their
own without learning anything about the outcome of the lottery. The equilibrium
property is that each player finds it optimal to commit ex ante to use the strategy
selected by the lottery.
In the context of the climate change negotiations, the mediator should be
some sort of governing body, which would provide a direction to all the countries
towards the ultimate goal of emission reduction. By correlation, the mediator
may not suggest the countries specifically what startegy to pursue, but rather
draw their attention towards a small set of strategies worth to be a subject of
deeper analysis. Forgo´, Fulop and Prill (2005) have tried to analyze the climate
change negotiations using the concept of tree-correlated equilibrium2, and Forgo´
1 However, not fully, as shown by Kar, Ray and Serrano (2010).
2 Tree-correlated equilibrium applies the concept of CCE in extensive form games with perfect
information. The players at each decision node have to decide whether to commit to the
mediator (in which case the game moves according to the suggestion of the mediator) or not.
If the player decides not to commit, then the mediator withdraws from mediation and the
game proceeds unattended.
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(2011) introduced the idea of soft-correlated equilibrium3 to analyse such games.
Both these equilibrium concepts are (modified) versions of CCE.
First we should note that for the abatement game there is unique CE which
coincides with the NE of the game (because the abatement game is a game with
a smooth and concave potential function). However, the game has many more
CCEs, and we try to derive the optimal CCE using the two-step algorithm intro-
duced in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014) to compute the most efficient CCE
in a symmetric 2-person game with quadratic payoff functions.
Applying the results of Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978), where they show
that the NE can be locally improved by (a concept similar to) CCE under certain
parametric condition. In case of the abatement game (equation 3.3) the condition
comes out to be that the benefit parameter (b) is bigger than the cost parameter
(c). For our formal characterisation of the optimal CCE for any 2-player abate-
ment game (Theorem 3.5) we assume that b > c. As in Moulin, Ray and Sen
Gupta (2014), we find that the optimal lottery is a 2-dimensional anti-diagonal4
symmetric lottery.5 The total payoff at the optimal CCE is very close to the
efficient payoff for this class of games, with a small improvement above the Nash
3 In this, like coarse correlation, the players have to first decide whether or not to commit
to the mediator, after which the mediator selects an action profile based upon a commonly
known probability distribution. The player who decides not to commit to the mediator can
choose any alternate strategy, except for the one selected by the mediator; unlike coarse
correlation where a deviant can choose to play any strategy (even the ones selected by the
mediator).
4 An anti-diagonal symmetric lottery is the one where only the anti-diagonal elements of the
(k x k) probability distribution matrix are strictly positive, i.e., pij > 0, when i+ j = k + 1
and pij = 0, when i+ j 6= k + 1.
5 As in the example, the optimal lottery is a symmetric lottery with finite support similar to
those studied by Ray and Sen Gupta (2013) who called such a lottery a Simple Symmetric
Correlation Device (SSCD) as introduced in Ganguly and Ray (2005) to discuss correlation.
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equilibrium total payoff. 6
The chapter proceeds in the following manner: we define CCEs in Subsection
3.2.1 and present the two-person abatement game in Subsection 3.2.2. Section 3.3
develops our general methodology to compute the optimal CCE for the 2-player
abatement game while Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 MODEL
3.2.1 Coarse Correlation
This subsection, borrowed from Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014), is given here
for the sake of completeness.
Fix a two-person normal form game, G = [X1, X2;u1, u2], where the strategy
sets are closed real intervals and the payoff functions ui : X1 ×X2 → R, i = 1, 2,
are continuous. We write C(X1 × X2) for the set of such continuous functions
and similarly, C(Xi) for the set of continuous functions on Xi.
Let L (X1 ×X2) with generic element L and L (Xi) with generic element `i
be the sets of probability measures on X1 × X2 and Xi respectively. That is to
say, L is a Radon measure7 on X1 × X2 of mass 1 (similarly, so is `i, on Xi).
We write the mean of ui(x1, x2) with respect to L as ui(L); similarly, f(`i) is the
mean of f(xi) with respect to `i for any f ∈ C(Xi). Given L ∈ L (X1 ×X2), we
6 From Corollary 3.6 and footnote 15, the ratio of CCE to efficient payoff is atleast 34 , which
can also be seen from Figure 3.1. Similarly, as noted in Figure 3.3 and the example in the
Conclusion section, the maximum improvement over Nash equilibrium payoff achievable is
just above 12%.
7 A positive linear functional on C(X1 ×X2).
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write Li for the marginal distribution of L on Xi, defined as follows:
∀f ∈ C(X1), f(L1) = f ∗(L), where f ∗(x1, x2) = f(x1)8 for all x1, x2 ∈ X1 ×X2
(3.1)
(with a symmetric definition for L2).
The deterministic distribution at z9 is denoted by δz, and for a product dis-
tributions such as δx1 ⊗ `2 we write ui(δx1 ⊗ `2) simply as ui(x1, `2).
Definition 3.1. A coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) of the game G is a lottery
L ∈ L (X1 ×X2) such that
u1(L) ≥ u1(x1, L2) and u2(L) ≥ u2(L1, x2) for all (x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2. (3.2)
The discussion of the mediator in the Introduction can be formalized by the
normal form game G˜ = [X1∪{N}, X2∪{N}; u˜1, u˜2] where the additional strategy
N means “commit to the outcome of L”. Payoffs are the same as in G if no player
chooses N, otherwise are as follows:
u˜1(N,N) = u1(L); u˜1(N, x2) = u1(L1, x2); u˜1(x1,N) = u1(x1, L2)
Then, L is a CCE if and only if (N,N) is a Nash equilibrium of G˜.
8 Fixing an x2 the probability distribution is defined over f(x1)
9 i.e. with a probability of 1, outcome z is chosen by the lottery.
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3.2.2 Abatement Game and CCEs
We consider the model proposed in Barrett (1994) with two countries (n = 2).
The payoff function of a country is a function of the emission abated by both
countries q1 and q2. Let us write the total emission abated as Q = q1 + q2 and
therefore we have the benefit function10 of country i as
Bi(Q) =
B
2
(AQ− Q
2
2
).
The cost function of each country is a function of its own emission abatement
level qi and is given as Ci(qi) =
Cq2i
2
. The payoff function of country 1 (and
similarly for country 2) is thus given by
u1(q1, q2) =
AB
2
(q1 +q2)−B
4
(q1 +q2)
2− C
2
q21, where A, B and C are all positive.
We call the above model an abatement game. Although the model is similar
to the Cournot game, the purpose of this paper is to put forward the relevance
of the notion of correlation in environment literature.
We introduce the Barrett’s model as it stands and then re-write it in order
to compare it with the general quadratic model provided in Moulin, Ray and
Sen Gupta (2014). We set a = AB
2
, b = B
4
, c = C
2
and rewrite the above payoff
function in the following form (as in the general model of Moulin, Ray and Sen
10 Note that the benefit function in the published version of Barrett (1994) has a typo that we
have corrected here.
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Gupta 2014):
u1(q1, q2) = a(q1 + q2)− b(q1 + q2)2 − cq21; u2(q1, q2) = u1(q2, q1). (3.3)
Given q2, the best response of country 1 (and similarly for country 2) is
BR1(q2) =
∂u1(q1,q2)
∂q1
= a − 2b(q1 + q2) − 2cq1. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium
(qNeq1 , q
Neq
2 ) and corresponding (total) payoff pi
Neq are
qNeq1 = q
Neq
2 =
a
2(2b+ c)
; piNeq =
a2(4b+ 3c)
2(2b+ c)2
.
We now compute the efficient profile of emission abatements (qeff1 , q
eff
2 ). To
maximize the total payoff u1(q1, q2) + u2(q1, q2) = 2a(q1 + q2) − 2b(q1 + q2)2 −
c(q21 + q
2
2), we clearly need to choose q1 = q2 (due to symmetry, the efficient level
of abatement should be same for two similar countries); we find
qeff1 = q
eff
2 =
a
4b+ c
; pieff =
2a2
4b+ c
.
Therefore, the relative efficiency ratio of the Nash outcome is pi
Neq
pieff
=
(4+3λ)(4+λ)
4(2+λ)2
, where λ = c
b
, which is plotted below in Figure 3.1.
The abatement game is a game with the potential function P (q1, q2) = a(q1 +
q2)− b(q1 + q2)2 − c(q21 + q22), which is smooth and concave. Therefore, the only
CE is the Nash equilibrium qNeq (Neyman 1997).
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3.3 RESULTS
Our goal is to compute the CCEs that maximize the total payoff u1 + u2. We
then compare this joint payoff with the Nash equilibrium payoff and comment on
the efficiency of the former. As the abatement game is symmetric, we can limit
our search to symmetric lotteries L only (as explained in Moulin, Ray and Sen
Gupta 2014, when we identify an optimal symmetric CCE, we are also capturing
an optimal CCE among all CCEs, symmetric or otherwise). We denote the set
of symmetric lotteries by L sy(R2+).
We first characterize the equilibrium condition (3.2) presented in Definition 1
in terms of three moments of L. If L is the distribution of the symmetric random
variable (Z1, Z2), we are interested in the expected values of Zi, Z
2
i , and Z1 · Z2
as denoted below.
α = EL[Zi]; β = EL[Z
2
i ]; γ = EL[Z1 · Z2]
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Lemma 3.2. A symmetric lottery L ∈ L sy(R2+) is a CCE of the abatement game
if and only if
max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2} ≤ aα− (b+ c)β − 2bγ (3.4)
and the corresponding utility (for one player) is
u1(L) = 2aα− (2b+ c)β − 2bγ.
Proof. First note that (by 3.3) the expected utility (for one player) from any
lottery L ∈ L sy(R2+) can be written as
u1(L) = aEL[Z1] + aEL[Z2]− bEL[Z21 ]− bEL[Z22 ]− 2bEL[Z1 · Z2]− cEL[Z21 ],
which by symmetry is
u1(L) = 2aEL[Z1]− (2b+ c)EL[Z21 ]− 2bEL[Z1 · Z2]
= 2aα− (2b+ c)β − 2bγ.
We write the expected payoff when player 1 plays a pure strategy z and player
2 commits to L, as
u1(z, L
2) = az + aEL[Z2]− bz2 − bEL[Z22 ]− 2bzEL[Z2]− cz2
= (a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2 + aα− bβ.
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Hence, L is a CCE if and only if
max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2}+ aα− bβ ≤ 2aα− (2b+ c)β − 2bγ,
which, after rearranging, gives us the condition in the statement.
The next result is due to Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014). It identifies the
range of the vector (α, β, γ) when L ∈ L sy(R2+) and also shows that this range is
covered by two families of very simple lotteries with at most four strategy profiles
in their support.
Let L ∗ be the subset of L sy(R2+) containing the simple lotteries of the form
L = q
2
(δz,z+δz′,z′)+
p
2
(δz,z′+δz′,z), where z, z
′, q and p are non-negative and q+p =
1. LetL ∗∗ be the subset ofL sy(R2+) of the form L = q ·δz,z+q′ ·δ0,0+ p2(δ0,z+δz,0),
where z, q, q′ and p are non-negative and q + q′ + p = 1. Intuitively, the number
of different types of lotteries satisfying 3.5 can only be a discrete/finite set; and
it turns out to be just these two types of simple lotteries11.
Lemma 3.3. i) For any L ∈ L sy(R2+) and the corresponding random variable
(Z1, Z2), we have
α, γ ≥ 0; β ≥ γ; β + γ ≥ 2α2; (3.5)
ii) Equality β = γ holds if and only if L is diagonal: Z1 = Z2 (a.e.)
12 ;
iii) Equality β + γ = 2α2 holds if and only if L is anti-diagonal: Z1 + Z2 is
constant (a.e.);
11 L ∗ is not a subset of L ∗∗ because L ∗ can have any z′ 6= 0 as well.
12 Z1 = Z2 implies the lottery L has non-zero probabilities on the same elements of Z1 and Z2,
i.e. L is a diagonal lottery.
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iv) For any (α, β, γ) ∈ R3+ satisfying inequalities (3.5), there exists L ∈ L ∗ ∪
L ∗∗ with these parameters.
Note that (3.5) implies β ≥ α2, with equality β = α2 if and only if L is
deterministic, because β = α2 implies both β = γ and β + γ = 2α2.
Lemma 3.3 is same as the Lemma 2.4 in Chapter 2, and the proof has been
provided in the Appendix of Chapter 2. Lemmata 3.2 and 3.3 now imply the fol-
lowing two-step algorithm (Proposition 3.4) to find the utility maximizing CCEs,
which is similar to Theorem 1 in Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014). Theorem
3.5 uses the two-step algorithm provided by Proposition 3.4 to find the optimal
CCE.
Proposition 3.4. Given the abatement game, the following nested programs gen-
erate the utility maximizing CCEs13:
Step 1: Fix α non negative, and solve the linear program
min
β,γ
{(2b+ c)β + 2bγ} under constraints
β ≥ γ ≥ 0; β + γ ≥ 2α2; (b+ c)β + 2bγ ≤ aα−max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2}.
Step 2: With the solutions β(α), γ(α) found in Step 1, solve
max
α
{2aα− (2b+ c)β(α)− 2bγ(α)} under constraints
α ≥ 0; max
z≥0
{(a− 2bα)z − (b+ c)z2} ≤ aα− (b+ c)β(α)− 2bγ(α).
13 Theorem 3.5 gives us the specific lottery.
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Moreover, there is a utility maximizing CCE in L ∗ ∪L ∗∗.
3.3.1 Optimal CCE
Proposition 3.4 implies the following characterization of the utility maximizing
CCE for our games.
Theorem 3.5. i) If b ≤ c, the Nash equilibrium of the abatement game is its
only CCE.
ii) If b > c, setting λ = c
b
14, the optimal values of the three moments of the
utility maximizing L are given by (α˜, β˜, γ˜):
α˜ =
a
b
2 + 2λ− λ2
2(4 + 5λ)
,
β˜ =
a2
b2
4 + 8λ+ λ2 − 4λ3
4(4 + 5λ)2
and γ˜ =
a2
b2
4 + 8λ− λ2 − 4λ3 + 2λ4
4(4 + 5λ)2
;
while the optimal CCE is L˜ = 1
2
δ(z,z′) +
1
2
δ(z′,z), with
z, z′ =
a
b
2 + 2λ− λ2 ± λ√1− λ2
2(4 + 5λ)
.
Proof. First, consider the equilibrium condition (3.4) as in Lemma 3.2. We have
two cases to consider:
Case (i): a − 2bα < 0 ⇐⇒ α > a
2b
. The L.H.S. of the inequality (the maximum
over z ≥ 0) is zero; therefore, (3.4) becomes aα ≥ (b + c)β + 2bγ. The R.H.S
from the above is b(β + γ) + cβ + bγ > b(β + γ). Now, b(β + γ) ≥ 2bα2 (from
14 We put λ = cb for computational ease later on in the proof.
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Lemma 3.3 (i)), which further implies that α ≤ a
2b
, which is a contradiction from
where we started.
So, we must have,
Case (ii): α ≤ a
2b
; then the L.H.S. of (3.4) is (a−2bα)
2
4(b+c)
. The equilibrium condition
is now
(b+ c)β + 2bγ ≤ aα− (a− 2bα)
2
4(b+ c)
= −b
2α2 − a(2b+ c)α + a2
4
b+ c
. (3.6)
We now fix α and solve Step 1 in Proposition 1: we must minimize (2b+c)β+2bγ
in the polytope Ψ = {(β, γ)|β ≥ γ, β + γ ≥ 2α2} under the additional constraint
(3.6). Note that Ψ is unbounded from above and bounded from below by the
interval [P,Q], where P = (α2, α2) and Q = (2α2, 0). We distinguish two cases
here.
Case 1 (b ≤ c): In this case, the minimum in Ψ of both (2b+ c)β + 2bγ and
(b+ c)β + 2bγ is achieved at P . Therefore, if P meets (3.6) it is our optimal pair
(β(α), γ(α)); otherwise, there is no CCE for this choice of α. Now, P meets (3.6)
if and only if (3b+ c)α2 ≤ − b2α2−a(2b+c)α+a
2
4
b+c
, which reduces to [a−(2b+ c)α)]2 ≤
0⇐⇒ α = a
2(2b+c)
= qNeqi . By Lemma 3.3 the optimal CCE L is diagonal (β = γ)
and deterministic (β = α2). It is simply the Nash equilibrium L = δqNeq of our
game.
Case 2 (b > c): Here, the minimum of (b+ c)β + 2bγ in Ψ is achieved at Q;
so, if Q fails to meet the constraint (3.6) there is no hope to meet it anywhere in
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Ψ. Thus, we must choose α such that
2(b+c)α2 ≤ −b
2α2 − a(2b+ c)α + a2
4
b+ c
⇐⇒ Λ(α) = (3b2+4bc+2c2)α2−a(2b+c)α+a
2
4
≤ 0
(3.7)
The discriminant of the right-hand polynomial Λ(α) is a2(b2−c2); therefore, (3.7)
restricts α to an interval [α−, α+], between the two positive roots of Λ(α). For
such a choice of α, the constraint (3.6) cuts a subinterval [R,Q] of [P,Q], where
R meets (3.6) as an equality. Note that R = P only if α = qNeqi (from Case 1 and
the fact that Λ(qNeqi ) < 0), otherwise R 6= P . Clearly, R is our optimal choice
(β(α), γ(α)) and it solves the system
β + γ = 2α2; (b+ c)β + 2bγ = −b
2α2 − a(2b+ c)α + a2
4
b+ c
.
Therefore,
β(α) =
1
b2 − c2
[
b(5b+ 4c)α2 − a(2b+ c)α + a
2
4
]
and
γ(α) =
1
b2 − c2
[
−(3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α2 + a(2b+ c)α− a
2
4
]
.
Now in Step 2 of Proposition 3.4, we must maximize 2aα−(2b+c)β(α)−2bγ(α)
under the constraints α ≥ 0 and Λ(α) ≤ 0. Developing this objective function
yields the program
1
b2 − c2 maxα {−b
2(4b+ 5c)α2 + a(2b2 + 2bc− c2)α− a
2c
4
} (3.8)
3.3. RESULTS 71
under the constraints
α ≥ 0 and Λ(α) = (3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α2 − a(2b+ c)α + a
2
4
≤ 0.
The unconstrained maximum of the objective function is achieved at α˜ =
a(2b2+2bc−c2)
2b2(4b+5c)
.
We now show that Λ(α˜) ≤ 0. With the change of variable λ = c
b
, this amounts
to
(3 + 4λ+ 2λ2)(2 + 2λ− λ2)2
4(4 + 5λ)2
− (2 + λ)(2 + 2λ− λ
2)
2(4 + 5λ)
+
1
4
≤ 0
⇐⇒ 4 + 8λ− 5λ2 − 12λ3 + 3λ4 + 4λ5 − 2λ6 ≥ 0
The above polynomial is 0 at λ = 1; it is also easy to check, numerically, that it
is non-negative on [0, 1]. The proof is complete if we now express α˜, β˜ and γ˜ in
terms of λ. This is indeed easy for α˜ = a(2b
2+2bc−c2)
2b2(4b+5c)
= a
b
2+2λ−λ2
2(4+5λ)
. One may also
verify, using the expression for α˜ that
β˜ = β(α˜) =
1
b2 − c2
[
b(5b+ 4c)α˜2 − a(2b+ c)α˜ + a
2
4
]
=
a2
b2
4 + 8λ+ λ2 − 4λ3
4(4 + 5λ)2
and
γ˜ = γ(α˜) =
1
b2 − c2
[
−(3b2 + 4bc+ 2c2)α˜2 + a(2b+ c)α˜− a
2
4
]
=
a2
b2
4 + 8λ− λ2 − 4λ3 + 2λ4
4(4 + 5λ)2
.
Finally, we construct the optimal CCE L˜. From β˜ + γ˜ = 2α˜2 and Lemma
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3.3(iii), we see that L˜ is an anti-diagonal lottery of the form L˜ = 1
2
δ(z,z′) +
1
2
δ(z′,z),
where z and z′ are non-negative numbers such that z+z′ = 2α˜ and z2 +z′2 = 2β˜.
This implies 2zz′ = (2α˜)2− (2β˜) = 2γ˜, hence z, z′ solve Z2− 2α˜Z + γ˜ = 0. Thus,
z = z′ = α˜ ±
√
α˜2 − γ˜. The discriminant is α˜2 − γ˜ = β˜ − α˜2 = a2
b2
λ2(1−λ2)
4(4+5λ)2
; thus
the expressions for z and z′ follow.
3.3.2 Efficiency Performance
We now compare the optimal CCE (total) profit piCC = 2u1(L˜), with both efficient
and Nash equilibrium (total) profits. From the expression (3.8) of the single
player profit u1(L˜) and the expression of α˜ in Theorem 3.5(ii), straightforward
computations provide
u1(L˜) =
1
b2 − c2 [
a2
b2
(2 + 2λ− λ2)2
4(4 + 5λ)
− a
2c
4b2
] =
a2
b
4 + 4λ− λ2
4(4 + 5λ)
.
Recalling
pieff =
2a2
4b+ c
=
a2
b
2
4 + λ
and piNeq =
a2(4b+ 3c)
2(2b+ c)2
=
a2
b
4 + 3λ
2(2 + λ)2
,
we can now state the following.
Corollary 3.6. For the abatement game, the relative efficiency of the optimal
CCE and its relative improvement over the symmetric Nash equilibrium payoff
depend only upon λ = c
b
, as follows:
piCC
pieff
=
(4 + λ)(4 + 4λ− λ2)
4(4 + 5λ)
for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
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piCC
piNeq
=

(2+λ)2(4+4λ−λ2)
(4+5λ)(4+3λ)
for 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
1 λ ≥ 1
Corollary 3.6 on the behaviour of the efficiency ratios is described in Fig-
ures 3.215 and 3.3.
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Figure 3.2: pi
CC
pieff
in the abatement game
15 Note that for λ > 1, pi
CC
pieff
= pi
Neq
pieff
and therefore Figure 3.1 is relevant for λ > 1.
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3.4 CONCLUSION
We have analyzed coarse correlated equilibria in a class of 2-person symmetric
game called the abatement game where correlation a la Aumann does not offer
anything more than the Nash equilibrium. Incorporating the techniques intro-
duced by Moulin, Ray and Sen Gupta (2014), we have characterized the utility
maximizing CCE and have shown that they have a very simple support with only
four deterministic strategy profiles. The intuition behind these lotteries comes
from 3.5 and the idea that the number of different types of lotteries satisfying
this condition is finite and turns out to be the ones described as simple lotter-
ies. Such a computation is the first of its kind for coarse correlated equilibria for
the abatement game and, this is why we regard this exercise as an interesting
first step towards more sophisticated computations to understand mediation in
general for such games.
We conclude by considering an example and illustrating our results more for-
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mally. Consider the following values of the parameters, a = 1, b = 2 and c = 1
in the abatement game. Here, λ = c
b
= 1
2
< 1 and the payoff function16 is
given by u1(q1, q2) = (q1 + q2)− 2(q1 + q2)2− q21, with Nash equilibrium quantity,
qNeq = a
2(2b+c)
= 1
10
.
From Theorem 3.5, the corresponding optimal values of the moments are:
α˜ = 11
104
≈ 0.1057,
β˜ = 31
2704
≈ 0.0114 and
γ˜ = 59
5408
≈ 0.0109.
The optimal CCE is the lottery L˜ = 1
2
δ(z,z′) +
1
2
δ(z′,z), where δ(z′,z) is the
deterministic outcome z, z′. z, z′ = {11+
√
3
104
, 11−
√
3
104
}, with z + z′ = 22
104
, i.e., with
equal probability, one country abates qi =
11+
√
3
104
while the other chooses 11−
√
3
104
,
and vice versa. The above lottery is clearly not a CE because (11+
√
3
104
, 11−
√
3
104
) is
not a Nash equilibrium. But it is a CCE: if player 1 chooses q1 and assumes
player 2 is choosing either 11+
√
3
104
or 11−
√
3
104
with equal probability, his expected
payoff [15
26
q1 − 3q21 + 11104 − (11+
√
3
104
)2 − (11−
√
3
104
)2] is maximized at q1 =
5
52
and gives
him u1 =
23
208
, precisely the same as by committing to follow the outcome of L,
that generates the expected utility of u1(L) = (z+ z
′)− 2(z+ z′)2− 1
2
(z2 + z′2) =
23
208
≈ 0.1105.
The optimal CCE (total) payoff is piCC = 2u1(L˜) =
23
104
≈ 0.2211. One
may be surprised to note that this CCE has an improvement ratio pi
CC
piNeq
of only
575
572
≈ 1.0052, yielding just about 1
2
% increase over and above the Nash equilibrium
payoff. This is because in this class of games, the Nash equilibrium can be actually
16 Note that comparing it with the general model (equation 2.5 in Chapter 2), we have the
values of the parameters as follows: a = b = 1, c = −4, d = −3 and e = −2.
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very close to the efficient outcome (which maximizes the joint payoff). For this
particular example, the efficient (total) payoff that the players can jointly achieve
is 2
9
≈ 0.2222, and the Nash equilibrium (total) payoff 0.22 is 99% efficient.
So the optimal CCE only incurs about 1
2
% of efficiency loss. Although, not a
large amount of improvement over Nash equilibrium payoff is achieved by coarse
correlation, one of the positives of using this notion of coarse correlation is that
a better coordination amongst the countries could be achieved, which may be
helpful in the reduction of free-riding incentives and thereby a more effective
global emission abatement.
Chapter 4
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in
Linear Duopoly Games
4.1 INTRODUCTION
We know from the pioneering works of Azariadis (1981) and Cass and Shell (1983)
that extrinsic uncertainty matters in competitive economies. Does it matter in
strategic markets as well? The answer we get from the literature is unfortunately
partial and thus inconclusive, to some extent.
First of all, we should note that two notions of extrinsic uncertainty, for-
mulated as, sunspot equilibrium in competitive markets (Azariadis 1981, Cass
and Shell 1983) and correlated equilibrium in non-cooperative games (Aumann
1974, 1987), are very similar in nature and indeed closely connected, as noted by
Maskin and Tirole 1987; Aumann et al. 1988, and formally presented by Pole-
marchakis and Ray (2006), where they proved that correlated equilibrium a la
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Aumann corresponds to sunspot equilibria in the associated, competitive econ-
omy and provided a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of such an
effective correlation.
Within the realm of strategic markets, on one hand, we know from a recent
literature (Peck 1994, Forges and Peck 1995, Da´vila 1999, among others) that in-
deed sunspot equilibria exist in strategic market games a la Shapley and Shubik
(1977). On the other hand, in oligopoly models, Liu (1996) and Yi (1997) proved
that the only correlated equilibrium for such games is the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium of the market. Neyman (1997) generalised Liu’s results to conclude that
games with a smooth and concave potential function have a unique correlated
equilibrium which coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the game. Ui (2008)
generalises the results of Neyman (1997) to state a weaker condition which suf-
fices for the uniqueness of a CE. Hence, one may ask whether there exists a link
between correlation and sunspots in oligopoly models.
Although correlation a la Aumann may not achieve anything more than the
Nash equilibrium outcome, as one rightly reckons, a coarsening of the set of
correlated equilibria may exist in certain oligopoly models. Indeed, we do have
such a coarse concept in the literature, introduced by Moulin and Vial (1978),
called the CCE, that has recently evoked interests in several contexts (Young
2004, Forgo´ et al. 2005, Roughgarden 2009, Forgo´ 2010, 2011, Moulin et al. 2013,
2014).This concept has already been used by Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) in
specific duopoly games to achieve an improvement over the Nash equilibrium
payoff.
4.1. INTRODUCTION 79
There are, however, a few gaps worth mentioning in the above strands of lit-
erature. First, from the analysis by Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978), we learn
under what conditions Nash equilibrium of the duopoly game can be locally im-
proved upon, using a specific notion of improvement with strategies close to the
Nash equilibrium; however, we do not know, for improvement or even for exis-
tence, whether the support of such a correlation device necessarily has to be close
to the Nash equilibrium or not. Second, from the above mentioned literature on
correlation and sunspots, we do not find the connection, if there is any, between
(coarse) correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium in oligopoly models, in
particular, duopoly games.
The purpose of this paper is precisely to bridge these gaps and thus is twofold.
We would like to see the existence of a general (non-local) coarse correlated equi-
librium in strategic markets and the relation of this equilibrium with sunspots.
We consider a specific form of correlation device, that we call a k-Simple Symmet-
ric Correlation Device (k-SSCD). The device is named so (by Ganguly and Ray
2005) because the discrete probability distribution is symmetric and the support
of it is finite. We apply the notion of coarse correlation a la Moulin and Vial
(1978) and fully characterise an equilibrium concept that we call k-Simple Sym-
metric Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (k-SSCCE) for the linear duopoly game
(Theorem 1). Clearly, the deterministic device that chooses only the Nash equi-
librium outcome is a k-SSCCE; however, unlike Aumann’s correlated equilibrium,
this is not the only equilibrium according to our notion.
We identify a particular sunspot structure, that we call a Nash-centric de-
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vice, which is a symmetric anti-diagonal probability distribution over equi-distant
quantities around the Nash equilibrium point. We prove that any Nash-centric
device is a k-SSCCE. This result (Theorem 2) holds for any such Nash-centric
devices, regardless of its dimension, probabilities and the distances between the
quantity levels, as long as this particular structure is maintained. Moreover, we
observe that this is the unique equilibrium among the devices with equi-distant
quantities and anti-diagonal probability distributions (Theorem 3). Also, we show
that any small unilateral perturbation from this structure is not an equilibrium.
Our results identify a specific random device that the players are willing to
commit to, in equilibrium. The Nash-centric device is a public randomisation over
strategy profiles, including non-Nash equilibrium points, which is the feature of a
sunspot equilibrium. However, we note that the expected payoff from the Nash-
centric device is equal to the Nash equilibrium payoff in the linear duopoly game.
Thus, unfortunately, this k-SSCCE can not improve upon the Nash equilibrium
which may raise questions on the benefits obtained by randomised devices.
We focus on a couple of positive aspects of our results and thus the advantages
of analysing coarse correlation in this context. First, it offers a way of generat-
ing the Nash equilibrium payoff using a solicitor that the players are willing to
commit to, in equilibrium. Second, as we know from the experimental literature,
coordinating on Nash equilibrium outcome is not easily achieved in many strate-
gic situations. Our equilibrium, k-SSCCE, offers an explanation of how to achieve
the Nash equilibrium payoff, in expected terms, which is also supported by some
recent experimental studies (for example, Duffy and Feltovich 2010, Bone et al.
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2012).
The chapter proceeds as follows: subsection 4.2.1 discusses the definitions of
CE and CCE (which in this chapter has been defined in accordance to the purpose
of the chapter), 4.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.2.4 introduce the linear duopoly game, simple
devices and the Nash centric devices, respectively; in section 4.3 we collect all our
results (which includes the characterisation of the k-SSCCE and uniqueness and
robustness results for Nash centric devices); and finally section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 MODEL
4.2.1 Correlation and Coarse Correlation
Fix any finite normal form game, G = [N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ], with set of players,
N = {1, ...., n}, finite pure strategy sets, S1, ...., Sn with S =
∏
i∈N Si, and payoff
functions, u1, ...., un, ui : S → <, for all i.
Definition 4.1. A (direct) correlation device µ is a probability distribution over
S.
A normal form game, G, can be extended by using a direct correlation device.
For correlation a la Aumann (1974, 1987), the device first selects a strategy profile
s(= (s1, ...., sn)) according to µ, and then sends the private recommendation si to
each player i. The extended game Gµ is the game where the correlation device µ
selects and sends recommendations to the players, and then the players play the
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original game G. A (pure)1 strategy for player i in the game Gµ is a map σi : Si →
Si and the corresponding (ex-ante, expected) payoff is given by, u
∗
i (σ1, ...., σn) =∑
s∈S µ(s)ui(σ1(s1), ...., σn(sn)). The obedient strategy profile is the identity map
σ∗i (si) = si, for all i, with payoff to player i given by u
∗
i (σ
∗) =
∑
s∈S µ(s)ui(s). The
device is called a correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974, 1987) if all the players
follow the recommended strategies, i.e., the obedient strategy profile constitutes
a Nash equilibrium of the extended game Gµ. Formally, with the notation s−i ∈
S−i =
∏
j 6=i Sj,
Definition 4.2. µ is a (direct) correlated equilibrium of the game G if for all i,
for all si, ti ∈ Si,
∑
s−i∈S−i µ(si, s−i)ui(si, s−i) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i µ(si, s−i)ui(ti, s−i).
One may use the direct correlation device, µ, in a different way. For a coarser
notion of correlation a la Moulin and Vial (1978), a game G is extended to a
game G′µ in which the strategies of a player is either to commit to the device or
to play any strategy in G. If all the players commit to the device, an outcome is
chosen by the device according to the probability distribution. Thus, the expected
payoff for any player i, when the device is accepted by all the players, is simply∑
s∈S µ(s)ui(s). Note that this is same as the payoff of the obedient strategy
profile under the correlated equilibrium a la Aumann as above. If one of the
players unilaterally deviates, while the others commit to the device, the deviant
faces the marginal probability distribution µ′i over s−i ∈ S−i which is given by
µ′i(s−i) =
∑
si∈Si µ(si, s−i). The coarse correlated equilibrium notion suggests
that the players will accept the device if the expected payoff from the device is
1 One can also think of behavioral strategies in any extended game. We, however, in this
paper, restrict ourselves to pure strategies only.
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higher than that from playing any other strategy, from the entire set of strategies.
Formally,
Definition 4.3. µ is a (direct) coarse correlated equilibrium of the game G if for
all i, for all ti ∈ Si,
∑
s∈S µ(s)ui(s) ≥
∑
s−i∈S−i µ
′
i(s−i)ui(ti, s−i).
From the system of inequalities2 in the above definitions, it is clear that the
set of coarse correlated equilibria is indeed coarser than the set of correlated equi-
libria.3 Also, it is obvious that any Nash equilibrium and any convex combination
of several Nash equilibria of any given game G, corresponds to a coarse correlated
and a correlated equilibrium.4
4.2.2 Linear Duopoly
In this paper, we use the simplest form of oligopoly models, that of a duopoly
market with linear demand function and constant marginal cost. Consider two
quantity-setting firms, each of whose strategy is to choose a quantity level q ∈
Q = {q : q ≥ 0} to produce at a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0 and to sell in a
market with an inverse demand function given by a− b(q1 + q2), with a > 0 and
b > 0. Thus the profit functions for the firms are given by Π1(q
1, q2) = aq1 −
2 Following Aumann (1974) and Moulin and Vial (1978), we have used weak inequalities in our
definitions (Definition 2 and Definition 3). We note that strict inequalities may be considered
in these definitions; indeed, Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) did so in their definition of
equilibrium.
3 It is also easy to prove that the set of correlated and coarse correlated equilibria coincide for
the case of 2× 2 games. However, as Moulin and Vial (1978) demonstrated, there are games
involving 2 players and 3 strategies for each player, for which the set of coarse correlated
equilibria is strictly larger than the sets of correlated and Nash equilibria.
4 Formally, let NE(G), CONV (G), CE(G) and CCE(G) denote, respectively, the sets of
all Nash equilibria, convex combination of Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria and coarse
correlated equilibria for any game G. Clearly, NE(G) ⊆ CONV (G) ⊆ CE(G) ⊆ CCE(G).
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b(q1)2−bq1q2−cq1 and Π2(q1, q2) = aq2−b(q2)2−bq1q2−cq2, where q1 and q2 are
quantity choices of firms 1 and 2, respectively. For simplicity and without loss of
any generality, for the rest of the paper, we set c = 0. Hence, the profit functions
are Π1(q
1, q2) = aq1 − b(q1)2 − bq1q2 and Π2(q1, q2) = aq2 − b(q2)2 − bq1q2. As it
is well-known, the Nash equilibrium outcome of this game is q1 = q2 = qNE =
a
3b
and the Nash equilibrium payoff to each firm is a
2
9b
. For the rest of the paper this
two-person game will be called the linear duopoly game.
Liu (1996) analysed an oligopoly model with n firms, each with a constant
marginal cost, ci for firm i (i = 1, ..., n) operating in a market with linear de-
mand, and proved that the only correlated equilibrium of this game is the unique
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Our game, clearly, is a special case of Liu’s model with
n = 2, and c1 = c2 = 0. Our game is a potential game with a smooth and concave
potential function, f , given by, f(q1, q2) = a(q1 + q2) − b[(q1)2 + q1q2 + (q2)2].
Therefore, the linear duopoly game has a unique correlated equilibrium a la Au-
mann that coincides with the Nash equilibrium of the game.
One may also wish to directly apply the result obtained by Gerard-Varet and
Moulin (1978), for improvement upon the Nash equilibrium payoff by coarse cor-
relation, in our game. Gerard-Varet and Moulin (1978) introduced a specific
notion of improvement using their coarse correlated equilibrium notion (see Foot-
note 2 above), with correlation devices whose support involve strategies close to
the Nash equilibrium outcome. They provided conditions under which such an
improvement is attained in duopoly games. Their theorem, unfortunately, does
not apply to our linear duopoly game. However, as pointed out in their paper
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(Gerard-Varet and Moulin, 1978, page 133), it can be directly proved that Nash
equilibrium of this game can not be improved upon by coarse correlation, using
their approach.
4.2.3 Simple Devices
We now consider a specific form of correlation device for our game. Although the
strategy sets in games, such as the linear duopoly game, are continuous, a device
may involve only finitely many strategies, i.e., the support of the probability
distribution in the direct correlation device may be finite. The structure of such
a simple device was used by Ganguly and Ray (2005) in their analysis of simple
mediation in cheap-talk games. Here, we consider such simple devices to analyse
coarse correlation in the linear duopoly game. Moreover, we impose symmetry in
the probability distribution and we restrict the device to use the same quantities
for both players. Formally, the specific form of the device we consider in this
paper is defined below.
Definition 4.4. A k-Simple Symmetric Correlation Device (k-SSCD), [P ; qc],
is a symmetric probability distribution matrix, P , over qc × qc, where, qc =
(q1, q2, ..., qk), with 0 < q1 < q2 < .... < qk; qi ∈ Q, and P = {(pij)i=1,2...,k;j=1,2...,k}
with each pij ∈ [0, 1], pij = pji and
∑
ij pij = 1.
The interpretation of a k-SSCD, [P ; qc] = [{(pij)i=1,2...,k;j=1,2...,k}; (qi)i=1,2...,k],
is that the players are given a choice to commit to the device. If both players
commit, the device will then pick the strategies qi and qj for the two players
respectively, with probability pij. The players do not play the game, however, get
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the profits Π1(qi, qj) and Π2(qi, qj), respectively, that correspond to the chosen
strategy profile (qi, qj). Thus, if both players commit to the device, the expected
payoffs for the two players are the same (by symmetry) and is given by EP (Π) =∑
ij pijpi1(qi, qj) =
∑
ij pijpi2(qi, qj) =
∑
ij pij[aqi − bq2i − bqiqj].
A player may decide not to commit to the device, in which case he may
play any strategy of his own, while the other commits to the device. Note that,
although the device, [P ; qc], involves only finitely many strategies, the deviation
for a player is however not restricted; any strategy q ∈ Q (even outside the
domain, qc, of the device) can be played by a player if he doesn’t commit to the
device. The deviating player can choose any strategy even outside of the ones
selected by the lottery. The deviant faces the marginal probability distribution p′
over qj ∈ qc which is given by p′(qj) =
∑
qi∈qc p(qi, qj). Let EP (Π | q) denote the
expected payoff of any deviating player (by symmetry) from playing q. Clearly,
EP (Π | q) =
∑
qj∈qc p
′(qj)Π(q, qj) =
∑
qj∈Qc p
′(qj)[aq− bq2− bqqj]. As mentioned,
the equilibrium condition requires that the device be accepted by both players.
Formally,
Definition 4.5. A k-SSCD, [P ; qc], is called a k-Simple Symmetric Coarse Cor-
related Equilibrium (k-SSCCE) if both players commit to the device, i.e., given
that the other player is committing to the device, a player does not deviate to
play any other strategy q ∈ Q, i.e., EP (Π) ≥ EP (Π | q), for all q ∈ Q.
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4.2.4 Nash-centric Devices
We now define different types of k-SSCD, [P ; qc], which we use later in this paper
for proving our results.
A k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities is a device for which qi = q1 + (i− 1)d,
1 ≤ i ≤ k, and thus can be denoted by [P ; q1; d].
A public or sunspot k-SSCD is a device for which the probability distribution
P is such that whenever pij > 0, the conditional probability of qi is 1, and vice
versa (in other words, each row and each column in the probability distribution
matrix has one and only one positive element).
An anti-diagonal k-SSCD is a device for which the probability distribution P
is an anti-diagonal distribution in which only the anti-diagonal elements of the
probability distribution matrix are strictly positive, i.e., pij > 0, when i+j = k+1
and pij = 0, when i + j 6= k + 1. Clearly, an anti-diagonal k-SSCD is a special
case of a public or sunspot k-SSCD and can be characterised by its positive
anti-diagonal elements only.
A Nash-centric k-SSCD is a device with equi-distant quantities and anti-
diagonal probability distribution for which the quantities are “Nash-centric”. We
distinguish between the two cases based on the dimension of qc being odd or even.
The Nash equilibrium quantity is included in the middle of the vector qc, for the
“odd” case, however, not in the “even” case.
Formally, for any odd k (k = 2m + 1), a Nash-centric k-SSCD is given by
qm+1 = qNE =
a
3b
and qi = qNE − (m+ 1− i) δ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k = 2m + 1, with
δ > 0 and δ < a
3bm
(so that q1 > 0). For any even k (k = 2m), a Nash-centric
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k-SSCD is a device with qi = qNE − (2m + 1 − 2i)δ for 1 ≤ i ≤ k = 2m, with
δ > 0 and δ < a
3b(2m−1) (so that q1 > 0).
The anti-diagonal probability distribution associated with this device is char-
acterised by its positive anti-diagonal elements only.
Formally, for any odd k (k = 2m+1), let pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, be the probability
of both strategy profiles (qi, qk+1−i) and (qk+1−i, qi) and (1− 2
m∑
i=1
pi) > 0 be
the probability attached to the Nash equilibrium strategy profile, i.e., pi(k+1−i) =
p(k+1−i)i = pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, p(m+1)(m+1) = 1− 2
m∑
i=1
pi and pij = 0, otherwise. For
any even k (k = 2m), let pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, be the probability of both strategy
profiles (qi, qk+1−i) and (qk+1−i, qi), with 2
m∑
i=1
pi = 1, i.e., pi(k+1−i) = p(k+1−i)i = pi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and pij = 0, otherwise.
A Nash-centric device (for any dimension) thus can be defined by
[k; (pi)1≤i≤m; δ]. We present such a Nash-centric device in a tabular form below
for any odd k (k = 2m+ 1).
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Strategies q1 q2 ... ... qm+1 ... ... .... qk
q1 = qNE −mδ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1
q2 = qNE − (m− 1) δ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p2 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
qm+1 = qNE =
a
3b
0 0 0 0 1− 2
m∑
i=1
pi 0 0 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
qk−1 = qNE + (m− 1) δ 0 p2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
qk = qNE +mδ p1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.3 RESULTS
4.3.1 Characterisation
We first characterise the condition for a k-SSCD to be a k-SSCCE for the linear
duopoly game. Following Definition 4.5, a k-SSCD is in equilibrium when the
expected payoff from the device is higher than that from any unilateral deviation
by a player. Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium is that
the expected payoff from the device is higher than the maximum of the payoffs
from any unilateral deviation. A k-SSCCE is thus characterised in the theorem
below.
Theorem 4.6. A k-SSCD, [P ; qc], is a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game if
and only if AP (qc) ≥ 0, where AP (qc) is given by
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3a
2
k∑
i=1
qi(
k∑
j=1
pij) − b
k∑
i=1
q2i [
k∑
j=1
pij + pii +
1
4
(
k∑
j=1
pij)
2] − b
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=2
qiqj[2pij +
1
2
(
k∑
s=1
pis)(
k∑
s=1
pjs)]− a24b .
Proof. From Definition 4.5, for any k-SSCD, [P ; qc], to be a k-SSCCE in the linear
duopoly game, we must have, EP (Π) ≥ EP (Π | q), for all q ∈ Q, which holds true
if and only if EP (Π)− EP (Π∗) ≥ 0, where, EP (Π∗) = Maxq∈QEP (Π | q).
First, we observe
EP (Π) = a
k∑
i=1
qi(
k∑
j=1
pij)− b
k∑
i=1
q2i (
k∑
j=1
pij)− b
k∑
i=1
qi(
∑k
j=1 pijqj)
and
EP (Π | q) = aq − bq2 − bq
k∑
i=1
qi(
k∑
j=1
pij).
Now, using the first order condition, ∂EP (Π|q)
∂q
= 0, EP (Π | q) is maximised at
q∗ = 1
2b
[a− b
k∑
i=1
qi(
k∑
j=1
pij)], with
EP (Π
∗) = a
2
4b
− a
2
k∑
i=1
qi(
k∑
j=1
pij)+
b
4
k∑
i=1
q2i (
k∑
j=1
pij)
2 + b
2
k−1∑
i=1
k∑
j=2
qiqj(
k∑
s=1
pis)(
k∑
s=1
pjs).
Now define AP (qc) = EP (Π) − EP (Π∗), which leads to the characterising
inequality in the statement of the theorem.
Clearly, the Nash equilibrium of the linear duopoly game can be viewed as a
device with probability 1 on the Nash equilibrium quantity, a
3b
, and is trivially a k-
SSCCE. This fact is observed in the above characterisation. Note that at the Nash
equilibrium point, the value of AP (qc) stated in Theorem 4.6 is indeed 0, satisfying
the condition weakly. Hence, the unique Nash and correlated equilibrium a la
Aumann of the linear duopoly game is indeed a k-SSCCE.
One may use the characterisation in Theorem 4.6, of a k-SSCCE, to find the
equilibrium condition for different types of k-SSCD, in particular any k-SSCD
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with equi-distant quantities. The following corollary characterises probability
distributions for such a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game. The inequality
in the following corollary is also used to prove some of our results later in this
paper.
Corollary 4.7. For the linear duopoly game, any probability distribution, P , can
be supported as a k-SSCCE with equi-distant quantities, with some q1 and d, if
and only if
2[
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij]
2−
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)2 (pii+
k∑
j=1
pij)−2
∑
1≤i<j≤k (i− 1) (j − 1) pij ≥
0.
Proof. Given a distribution, P , consider a k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities
[P ; q1; d]. We will use the equilibrium condition AP (qc) ≥ 0, in Theorem 4.6 for
such a k-SSCD. Substituting the values of qi = q1 + (i − 1)d, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and
simplifying, the expression
AP (qc) in Theorem 4.6 becomes
3a
2
k∑
i=1
[q1 + (i− 1)d](
k∑
j=1
pij)− b[q1 +
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)d]2[
k∑
j=1
pij + pii +
1
4
(
k∑
j=1
pij)
2]
−b ∑
1≤i<j≤k
[q1 + (i− 1)d][q1 + (j − 1)d][2pij + 12
k∑
s=1
pis
k∑
s=1
pjs]− a24b
= 3a
2
q1 +
3ad
2
[
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij]− bq21[2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
pij + (
1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
pij)
2]
−bq1d[4
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij +
1
2
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij(
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
pij)]
−bd2[
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)2 {pii +
k∑
j=1
pij +
1
4
(
k∑
j=1
pij)
2}+ 2∑1≤i<j≤k (i− 1) (j − 1) pij]
− bd2
2
[
∑
1≤i<j≤k
(i− 1) (j − 1)
k∑
s=1
pis
k∑
s=1
pjs]− a24b
= 3a
2
q1 +
3ad
2
[
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij]− 9b4 q21 − 9bd2 q1[
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij]
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−bd2[
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)2 {pii +
k∑
j=1
pij +
1
4
(
k∑
j=1
pij)
2}+ 2∑1≤i<j≤k (i− 1) (j − 1) pij]
− bd2
2
[
∑
1≤i<j≤k
(i− 1) (j − 1)
k∑
s=1
pis
k∑
s=1
pjs]− a24b .
To be an equilibrium, the above expression needs to be ≥ 0, for some values
of q1 and d. For any d > 0, we can view this expression as a function of q1. Thus,
a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium is
that the maximum value of this function be ≥ 0.
Using the first order condition, this is maximised at q̂1 =
1
3b
[a −
3bd{
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij}].
Using q̂1, the maximum value of AP (qc) becomes
bd2[2{
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)
k∑
j=1
pij}2−
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)2 (pii+
k∑
j=1
pij)−2
∑
1≤i<j≤k
(i− 1) (j − 1) pij]
The equilibrium condition thus requires the above to be ≥ 0. As both b and
d are > 0, this leads to the statement in the corollary.
The characterisation provided in Corollary 4.7 is important to analyse any
k-SSCCE with equi-distant quantities. We will use this characterisation to prove
some propositions later in this paper.
4.3.2 Uniqueness
We now show that the unique Nash and correlated equilibrium a la Aumann
of the linear duopoly game is not the only k-SSCCE for this game. Any Nash-
centric device is also a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game. Moreover, Nash-
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centric devices are the only equilibria among the set of k-SSCDs with equi-distant
quantities and anti-diagonal probability distribution.
To prove this uniqueness result, we observe a couple of properties of any k-
SSCD with equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal probability distribution.5
We first note that the expected payoff from any k-SSCD with equi-distant quan-
tities and anti-diagonal probability distribution, Ed(Π), can be expressed in terms
of the expected quantity of a player, q, as defined below.
Let us formally define the expected quantity of a player, q, for a k-SSCD with
equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal probability distribution. For an odd k
(= 2m+1), q =
m∑
i=1
pi(qi+q2m+2−i)+(1−2
m∑
i=1
pi)qm+1, while for an even k (= 2m),
q =
m∑
i=1
pi(qi + q2m+1−i), with qi = q1 + (i− 1)d, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Clearly, for an odd k
(= 2m+ 1), q = q1 +md, while for an even k (= 2m), q = q1 +
d(2m−1)
2
.
Therefore, note that for a Nash-centric device, for any k, q = qNE.
Let Π(q, q) denote the profit of any player in the linear duopoly game when
both players play the quantity q. The following lemma is in place.
Lemma 4.8. The expected profit of each player following any k-SSCD with equi-
distant quantities and anti-diagonal probability distribution is equal to the profit
when both players play their expected quantities in the linear duopoly game, i.e.,
Ed(Π) = Π(q, q).
Proof. The profit of a firm is given by Π(q, q) = aq − 2bq2.
5 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting Lemmata 4.8 and 4.9 to prove Theorems 4.10
and 4.11 directly using them.
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For k = 2m+1, we have q =
m∑
i=1
pi(qi+q2m+2−i)+(1−2
m∑
i=1
pi)qm+1 = q1 +md.
Substituting the value of q, we have, Π(q, q) = aq1−2bq21−4bmdq1+amd−2bm2d2.
The expected payoff from any k−SSCD with equi-distant quantities and an
anti-diagonal probability distribution is given by,
Ed(Π) =
m∑
i=1
pi[a(qi + q2m+2−i) − b(q2i + q22m+2−i) − 2bqiq2m+2−i] + (1 −
2
m∑
i=1
pi)[aqm+1 − 2bq2m+1]
= aq1 − 2bq21 − 4bmdq1 + amd− 2bm2d2 = Π(q, q).
Similarly, for k = 2m, we have q =
m∑
i=1
pi(qi + q2m+1−i) = q1 +
d(2m−1)
2
. In this
case,
Π(q, q) = aq1 − 2bq21 − 2bd(2m− 1)q1 + ad(2m−1)2 − bd
2(2m−1)2
2
and
Ed(Π) =
m∑
i=1
pi[a(qi + q2m+1−i)− b(q2i + q22m+1−i)− 2bqiq2m+1−i]
= aq1 − 2bq21 − 2bd(2m− 1)q1 + ad(2m−1)2 − bd
2(2m−1)2
2
= Π(q, q).
From Lemma 4.8, it follows immediately that the expected payoff from a
Nash-centric device, ENC(Π), is actually equal to that of the Nash equilibrium of
the linear duopoly game, that is, ENC(Π) =
a2
9b
.
We now consider the expected payoff of any deviating player from playing any
strategy q, Ed(Π | q), and the maximum payoff from deviating, Maxq∈QEd(Π |
q) = Ed(Π
∗) (say). The following lemma confirms that the best response of a
deviating player depends only on his (opponent’s) expected quantity, i.e.
Lemma 4.9. Ed(Π
∗) is a function of q.
Proof. For any k, suppose a player deviates from the k-SSCD with equi-distant
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quantities and an anti-diagonal probability to play an alternate strategy q. We
have, Ed(Π | q) = aq− bq2− bq
k∑
i=1
qi(
k∑
j=1
pij) = aq− bq2− bqq, which is maximised
at q = a−bq
2b
, with
Ed(Π
∗) = MaxEd(Π | q) = a24b − a2q + b4q2, for any k, which proves the
lemma.
Our results (Theorems 4.10 and 4.11) now follow from the above lemmata.
Theorem 4.10. Any Nash-centric device is a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly
game.
Proof. From Lemma 4.8, ENC(Π) =
a2
9b
. Let ENC(Π | q) denote the (expected)
payoff of the deviant from playing q. From Lemma 4.9, for any k, ENC(Π | q) =
aq − bq2 − bqqNE.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.6, for the Nash-centric device to be a k-SSCCE,
we must have, ENC(Π) ≥ ENC(Π | q) for all q ∈ Q, which holds true if and only
if ENC(Π) ≥Maxq∈QENC(Π | q) = ENC(Π∗) (say).
Using the proof of Lemma 4.9, ENC(Π | q) is maximised at q∗ = a−bqNE2b =
a−b( a
3b
)
2b
= a
3b
= qNE, with ENC(Π
∗) = aq∗ − bq∗2 − bq∗qNE = ENC(Π).
Hence, ENC(Π) = ENC(Π
∗) = Maxq∈QENC(Π | q), and thus any Nash-centric
device is a k-SSCCE.
As noted in the above proof, ENC(Π) = ENC(Π
∗); hence, any Nash-centric
device weakly satisfies the equilibrium condition for a k-SSCCE. Such a device
thus does not satisfy the (strict) equilibrium notion in Gerard-Varet and Moulin
(1978), as mentioned in Footnote 3.
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We observe that Theorem 4.10 holds for any Nash-centric device, i.e., for any
dimension k, any appropriate δ > 0 (as long as q1 > 0) and any anti-diagonal
probability distribution given by the probabilities pi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, maintaining
the Nash-centric structure.
We now prove that Nash-centric is the unique equilibrium structure among any
k-SSCDs with equi-distant quantities and anti-diagonal probability distributions.
Theorem 4.11. Nash-centric devices are the only k-SSCCE with equi-distant
quantities and an anti-diagonal probability distribution for the linear duopoly
game.
Proof. For any k-SSCD with equi-distant quantities and an anti-diagonal proba-
bility distribution to be a k-SSCCE, we must have, Ed(Π) ≥ Ed(Π∗). We consider
Ed(Π)− Ed(Π∗) as a function of q1 and find the maximum of this function.
For k = 2m+1, with q = q1 +md, Ed(Π)−Ed(Π∗) becomes (assuming, d = δ)
Ed(Π)− Ed(Π∗) =
(aq1−2bq21−4bmδq1 +amδ−2bm2δ2)− (a
2
4b
− a
2
q1− amδ2 + b4q21 + bδ
2m2
4
+ bδm
2
q1),
which is maximised at q̂1 =
a
3b
−mδ, the Nash centric quantity q1, for odd k,
with the distance between quantities, d = δ.
For, k = 2m, with q = q1 +
d(2m−1)
2
, Ed(Π) − Ed(Π∗) becomes (assuming,
d = 2δ)
Ed(Π)− Ed(Π∗) =
[aq1 − 2bq21 − 4bδ(2m− 1)q1 + aδ(2m− 1)− 2bδ2(2m− 1)2]
−[a2
4b
− a
2
q1 − aδ(2m−1)2 + b4q21 + bδ
2(2m−1)2
4
+ bδ(2m−1)
2
q1],
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which is maximised at q̂1 =
a
3b
− δ(2m− 1), the Nash centric quantity q1, for
even k, with the distance between quantities, d = 2δ.
Thus, for any k, the Nash-centric quantity q1 maximises the function Ed(Π)−
Ed(Π
∗) and we have, from Theorem 4.10, ENC(Π) = ENC(Π∗). Hence, the equi-
librium condition is weakly satisfied for Nash-centric devices and is not met for
any other k−SSCD with equi-distant quantities and an anti-diagonal probability
distribution.
As a direct consequence of the above, we can claim that the only 2−SSCCE
for the linear duopoly game is a Nash-centric device with q1 = qNE − δ and
q2 = qNE + δ for any 0 < δ <
a
3b
(to keep q1 > 0) and p12 = p21 =
1
2
. To
prove this claim one can use the equilibrium characterisation in Corollary 4.7,
because a 2−SSCD can trivially be viewed as a device with equi-distant quantities.
The condition in Corollary 4.7, for k = 2, becomes p12 − 2MN ≥ 0, where
M = p11 + p12 and N = 1 − M . The LHS of this condition can easily be
rearranged to −(p22M + p11N), which clearly is always < 0, unless p11 = p22 = 0.
4.3.3 Robustness
In what follows, we deal only with Nash-centric devices. All the results in the
rest of the paper relate to the characterisations presented in Theorem 4.6 and
Corollary 4.7.
We ask whether Nash-centric devices are robust equilibria for the linear
duopoly game or not. To do so, we first check how crucial the linear set-up
is.
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Let us consider a duopoly market with linear demand function, however with
quadratic costs (as analysed by Yi, 1997), where the firms’ strategy is to choose
a quantity q ∈ Q = {q : q ≥ 0}. The price and the cost function for firm i are
given by pi = a − qi − γqj, j 6= i, with 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and C(qi) = (qi)2. Thus the
profit functions are respectively, Π1(q
1, q2) = aq1−2(q1)2−γq1q2 and Π2(q1, q2) =
aq2 − 2(q2)2 − γq1q2, where q1 and q2 are the quantity choices of firms 1 and 2.
Let us call this game the quadratic duopoly game. The Nash equilibrium quantity
for the quadratic duopoly game is qNE =
a
4+γ
.
We show below that the Nash-centric equilibrium structure is not robust
against non-linearity. Indeed, for the quadratic duopoly game, no Nash-centric
device is an equilibrium.
Proposition 4.12. Any Nash-centric device is not a k-SSCCE for the quadratic
duopoly game.
Proof. Consider any Nash centric device for the quadratic duopoly game. The
expected payoff from following this device is given by,
ENC(Π) =
2a2
[4+γ]2
− 2δ2(2 − γ)[
m∑
i=1
(m + 1 − i)2pi], for any odd k (= 2m + 1),
and,
ENC(Π) =
2a2
[4+γ]2
− 2δ2(2− γ)[
m∑
i=1
(2m+ 1− 2i)2pi], for any even k (= 2m).
Let ENC(Π | q) denote the expected payoff of the deviant from playing q.
Then, for any k, ENC(Π | q) = aq − 2q2 − γqqNE.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.6, for the Nash centric device to be a k−SSCCE,
we must have, ENC(Π) ≥ ENC(Π | q), for all q ∈ Q, which holds true if and only
if ENC(Π) ≥Maxq∈QENC(Π | q).
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ENC(Π | q) is maximised at q∗ = a−γqNE4 , and Maxq∈QENC(Π | q) = 2a
2
(4+γ)2
.
ENC(Π)−Maxq∈QENC(Π | q) is clearly < 0, for any k. Hence, the equilibrium
condition, ENC(Π) ≥ Maxq∈QENC(Π | q) is never satisfied and thus the Nash
centric device is not an equilibrium for this game.
4.3.4 Perturbations
In this subsection, we prove that the Nash-centric structure is not robust as an
equilibrium in the linear duopoly game by showing that any small unilateral
perturbation of this device leads to a violation of the equilibrium condition.
We consider small unilateral changes in probabilities and quantities; first in
the probability distribution, keeping the quantity levels unchanged, and then in
the quantity levels, keeping the probability distribution fixed. We also consider
perturbed devices by adding one more quantity level.
Probability
We first consider a small change in the anti-diagonal probability distribution
associated with a Nash-centric device, without changing the quantities, which
still remain Nash-centric. We divide the perturbation in probabilities into two
cases: first, we change one of the zero off-diagonal elements and then we change
one of the zero diagonal elements.
First, for simplicity and without loss of generality, we change the first off-
diagonal element and make it positive. Let us make p12 = p21 > 0, and as a
consequence, (some of) the anti-diagonal probabilities will change. For an odd k,
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for simplicity, we change only the probability attached to the Nash equilibrium
strategy profile, p(m+1)(m+1), to (1− 2
m∑
i=1
pi − 2p12), with the rest of probabilities
remaining intact. For an even k, we need not specify the specific changes in the
anti-diagonal probabilities, as long as 1 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi = 2p12. Let us call this new
device, for any k, an off-diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device and
prove the following desired result.
Proposition 4.13. Any off-diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device is
not a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game.
Proof. For k = 2m + 1, from Corollary 4.7, the equilibrium condition for the
off-diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash centric device to be a k-SSCCE becomes
2[p21 +
m∑
i=1
(i− 1)pi +m(1− 2p12 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi) +
m∑
i=1
(2m+ 1− i)pi]2
−[p21 +
m∑
i=1
(i− 1)2pi +m2(1− 2p12 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi) +
m∑
i=1
(2m+ 1− i)2pi]
−[m2(1− 2p12 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi) + 2
m∑
i=1
(i− 1)(2m+ 1− i)pi] ≥ 0.
After simplification, the LHS of the above turns out to be (2m−1)2p21(2p21−
1), which is always < 0, unless p21 ≥ 12 , which is not possible.
Similarly, for k = 2m, the equilibrium condition turns out to be 4(m −
1)2p21(2p21 − 1), which is always < 0, unless p21 ≥ 12 , which is not possible.
Hence, the equilibrium condition is violated for any k.
Now, for simplicity and without loss of generality, let us change the first diag-
onal element and make it positive, i.e., let us make p11 > 0, and as a consequence
let us change (some of) the anti-diagonal probabilities. As earlier, for an odd
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k, for simplicity, we change only the probability attached to the Nash equilib-
rium strategy profile, p(m+1)(m+1), to 1 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi − p11, keeping the rest of the
probabilities intact. For an even k, we need not specify the specific changes in
the anti-diagonal probabilities, as long as 1− 2
m∑
i=1
pi = p11. Let us call this new
device, for any k, a diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device.
Proposition 4.14. Any diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash-centric device is not
a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game.
Proof. For k = 2m + 1, from Corollary 4.7, the equilibrium condition for the
diagonal-probability-perturbed Nash centric device to be a k-SSCCE becomes
2[
m∑
i=1
(i− 1)pi +m(1− p11 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi) +
m∑
i=1
(2m+ 1− i)pi]2
−[
m∑
i=1
(i− 1)2pi +m2(1− p11 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi) +
m∑
i=1
(2m+ 1− i)2pi]
−[m2(1− p11 − 2
m∑
i=1
pi) + {2
m∑
i=1
(i− 1)(2m+ 1− i)pi}] ≥ 0.
Simplifying, the LHS of the above turns out to be −2m2p11 (1− p11), which
is always < 0.
Similarly, for k = 2m, the equilibrium condition turns out to be (2m −
1)2(
m∑
i=1
pi)[2(
m∑
i=1
pi) − 1], which is ≥ 0, if and only if
m∑
i=1
pi ≥ 12 , which is further
possible only when p11 = 0, and thereby a contradiction.
Hence, the equilibrium condition is violated for any k.
Quantity
We now consider a small perturbation in the quantity levels, keeping the anti-
diagonal probability distribution fixed. For simplicity and without loss of gener-
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ality, let us change the first quantity. For k = 2m + 1, let q1 = qNE −mδ + ε,
while for k = 2m, let q1 = qNE − (2m − 1)δ + ε, keeping all other quantities to
be Nash-centric and equi-distant from each other. Let us call this new device a
quantity-perturbed device.
Proposition 4.15. Any quantity-perturbed Nash-centric device is not a k-SSCCE
for the linear duopoly game.
Note that the above proposition refers to a device that does not involve all
equi-distant quantities. Thus, unlike the previous propositions in this subsection,
here we can not use the characterisation in Corollary 4.7. The proof, however,
directly follows from the characterisation in Theorem 4.6.
Proof. From Theorem 4.6, substituting the values of q1 and other qi for i 6= 1,
(for any k), the expression AP (qc) becomes
3a
2
qNE − 9b4 q2NE + 3ap1ε2 − bε2(p1 + p1
2
4
)− 9bεp1
2
qNE − a24b .
For the quantity-perturbed Nash centric device to be a k-SSCCE, we need
the above expression to be ≥ 0. Now substituting qNE = a3b , the expression
becomes −bε2(p1 + p124 ), which is always < 0. Hence, the equilibrium condition
is violated.
Composition
Finally, we turn to another way of perturbing a Nash-centric device. We consider
a new device composed of one additional quantity level (other than the Nash
equilibrium quantity) along with the original Nash-centric device. Starting from
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a Nash-centric k-SSCCE (for any k), we construct a public (k + 1)-SSCD by
adding another quantity qε > 0 ( 6= a3b) for both players, with probability ε for
the strategy profile (qε, qε), coupled with the original Nash-centric device with
probability (1 − ε). Formally, given a Nash-centric device, [k; (pi)1≤i≤m; δ], we
construct a (k + 1)-SSCD, as follows.
For any odd k (= 2m + 1), the quantities are q1 = qε, qm+2 =
a
3b
= qNE and
qi = qNE − (m+ 2− i) δ for 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1(= 2m + 2), while for any even k
(= 2m), they are qi = qNE − (2m+ 3− 2i) δ for 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1(= 2m+ 1).
The probabilities are p11 = ε, p1j = pj1 = 0 for j = 2, ..., k + 1 (for any k).
For odd k (= 2m + 1), pi(k+3−i) = p(k+3−i)i = (1 − ε)pi−1, for 2 ≤ i ≤ m + 1,
p(m+2)(m+2) = (1 − ε)(1− 2
m∑
i=1
pi), and pij = 0, otherwise; for even k (= 2m),
pi(k+3−i) = p(k+3−i)i = (1− ε)pi−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ m+ 1, and pij = 0, otherwise. Note
that for any k,
k+1∑
i=2
k+1∑
j=2
pij = (1− ε).
We call this device a composite device.
Proposition 4.16. Any composite device is not a (k + 1)-SSCCE for the linear
duopoly game.
Proof. Following Theorem 4.6, for the composite device (for any k) the expression
AP (qc) becomes
3aε
2
qε +
3a(1−ε)
2
qNE − b(2ε+ ε24 )q2ε − bε(1−ε)2 qεqNE − b[2(1− ε) + (1−ε2 )2]q2NE − a
2
4b
.
Substituting qNE =
a
3b
, and rearranging, we get, AP (qc) = qε[
aε(8+ε)
6
] −
q2ε [
bε(8+ε)
4
] − a2ε(8+ε)
36b
, which can be viewed as a (quadratic) function in qε. This
function is maximised at qε =
a
3b
(the Nash equilibrium quantity) and the max-
imised value of the function is 0. Therefore, for any qε > 0, other than the Nash
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Equilibrium quantity, the value of AP (qc) is < 0.
From Theorem 4.6, for the composite device to be a (k+ 1)-SSCCE, we need
the above AP (qc) to be ≥ 0. However, from above, the value of the above function
is < 0, for any qε > 0, other than the Nash Equilibrium quantity. Hence, the
equilibrium condition is violated.
4.4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analysed the notion of coarse correlation in the simplest of
the oligopoly models, that of a duopoly with linear market demand and constant
marginal costs. We have defined and characterised an equilibrium notion, that
we call k-SSCCE, for this linear duopoly game. We have identified a particular
sunspot structure, that we call a Nash-centric device, which always serves as an
equilibrium for such a game; moreover, any small perturbation from this device
is not an equilibrium.
Any Nash-centric device is a special type of a public or sunspot k-SSCD,
as defined in this paper, and by Theorem 4.10, is also a k-SSCCE. We should
point out here that Nash-centric devices assign positive probabilities over non-
Nash equilibrium quantities as well. Such a sunspot structure is clearly not a
correlated equilibrium a la Aumann, as it is well-known that a public device can
only be a correlated equilibrium a la Aumann if and only if it is a convexification
of pure Nash equilibria.
We however note that the expected payoff from such a device is equal to the
Nash equilibrium payoff. We have also pointed out that although any Nash-
4.4. CONCLUSION 105
centric device is a k-SSCCE for the linear duopoly game, such devices may how-
ever fail to be so in duopoly models with quadratic costs such as one studied by
Yi (1997). For any general quadratic duopoly model, we also note that k-SSCCE,
even 2-SSCCE, other than the Nash-centric devices, exists and considerably im-
proves upon the Nash equilibrium. In a parallel paper, Moulin et al. (2014)
extensively analyse coarse correlated equilibria in quadratic potential games.
One may extend our research to several directions.6 First, following Young
(2004), one may ask under what conditions the regret minimization dynamics
converges to the set of Nash-centric devices in our set-up. Second, our main
result is similar in spirit to the work by Bo¨rgers and Janssen (1995) who identify
conditions under which the Nash equilibrium of the oligopolists’ game is the only
outcome that survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies. It will thus be
interesting to formally connect these two strands of literature. Finally, Forgo´
et al. (2005) analysed a related notion, called the soft correlated equilibrium,
in climate change models. We can similarly analyse our k-SSCCE, in particular,
Nash-centric devices in such models, where the objective function to be maximised
can be different from the sum of payoffs (such as, reduction in temperature in
climate change models). We defer all these issues to future research agenda.
6 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting some of these issues.
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